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MARKUS WAGNER*
Domestic regulatory decisions involving matters of human health or
the environment are increasingly coming under scrutiny by international
courts and tribunals. One of the latest examples concerns an Australian
law mandating the plain packaging of cigarettes, which is currently being
challenged under both international investment and international trade
law. Both of these fields are closely related and are governed by similar
rules. However, despite their similarities, they also differ in important
respects.
This article analyzes the extent of the regulatory space afforded to
states and World Trade Organization (“WTO”) members in the
international investment and international trade regimes. It does so by
comparing the jurisprudence of investment tribunals regarding
regulatory expropriations and the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute
settlement organs in cases concerning human, animal or plant life or
health, as well as cases concerning technical barriers to trade.
Additionally, this article suggests that international trade and
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investment law can offer valuable insights for one another, despite the
differences between the two regimes. While international trade law has
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns as a
countervailing force to the prevailing paradigm of trade liberalization,
changes in international investment law may soon close the gap.
International investment law is currently undergoing a discourse similar
to the one that has shaped international trade law since the inception of
the WTO in 1995. Thus international investment law may be shaped in a
similar manner, as there are growing signs that the regulatory space
afforded in international trade and investment law are converging,
despite the fact that the international trade law discussion was carried out
in a different context, through a different set of institutions, and within
different epistemic communities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of domestic economic activities was
traditionally a matter of a state’s regulatory power, subject mostly
to domestic legal and political constraints. International legal
obligations existed to the extent that a state entered into binding
international obligations to regulate or abstain from regulating
with respect to particular goods or services. States entered into
trade obligations that required them to lower tariff levels in
exchange for reciprocal benefits that at least part of its constituency
regarded as important. Similarly, states concluded treaties that
provided foreign investors the same treatment accorded to their
own nationals.
In short, countries had almost unlimited
“regulatory space.” They possessed a large degree of regulatory
autonomy, especially when making decisions that implicated noneconomic values such as human health, human safety, the
environment or social mobility.
The situation changed with the adoption of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 1 after WWII. The
GATT provided not only for mechanisms to reduce tariff barriers
and non-tariff barriers and contained a number of justificatory
provisions that seemed to afford the contracting parties a great
deal of regulatory space. The relative importance of non-tariff
barriers compared to tariff barriers became evident through a
growing number of complaints by other GATT parties against
domestic regulations, arguing that such regulations were in
contravention of the GATT.2 The establishment of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 accelerated this trend. 3 A
considerable number of disputes now involve complaints about
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
2 Roy Santana & Lee Ann Jackson, Standards and Non-Tariff Barriers in Trade,
11 World Trade Rev. 462, 465 et seq. (2012); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
344–45 (1993).
3
Santana & Jackson, supra note 2, at 470; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A CLOSER LOOK AT NONTARIFF MEASURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 39 et seq. (2012).
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regulations in the areas of health and the environment.
The increase in bilateral and multilateral investment
agreements over the last decades, guaranteeing rights to foreign
investors, has led to complaints not only against alleged
expropriations, but also against domestic regulations where no
property was actually seized.
These so-called regulatory
expropriations are akin to the “regulatory takings” under domestic
law in many countries. Some of the most famous complaints
include the devaluation of currency, while other complaints
oppose health and environmental regulations. Other potential
areas in which disputes may arise include the regulation of
antitrust/competition policy, taxation, the sale of securities,
banking requirements or human rights measures.
This article explores how the dispute settlement mechanisms in
both fields struggle with the concept of regulatory space. It
contrasts the developments in the areas of trade and investment
law, although questions concerning regulatory autonomy are not
limited to these two regimes. Importantly, investor-state dispute
settlement has come under increased scrutiny over the last years,
evidenced not only by public and academic debates, but also by
some countries reconsidering their commitment to investor-state
dispute settlement.4 The WTO has undergone similar debates after
its inception.5 Thus, another aim of the article is to show how the
WTO’s dispute settlement organs have been able to avoid
continued debates about the propriety of their jurisprudence. The
article analyzes the degree to which the regulatory space afforded
to governments converges between these two regimes, mainly
through analyzing disputes concerning health and the
environment. These disputes have been highly contentious in the
trade arena and have taken on great importance in recent
investment disputes.
An illustrative example of this convergence is the dispute
concerning Australia’s legislation concerning the plain packaging
of cigarettes. 6 The sale of cigarettes in Australia has been under

See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 World
Trade Rev. 7 (2002).
6
The dispute over Australia’s plain packaging law serves illustrative
4
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tight restrictions for years. One of the latest regulations of the sale
of cigarettes, which went into effect on December 1, 2012, is the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act.7 This law imposes strict packaging
requirements regarding the shape, size, and type of packaging and
cartons to be used for tobacco products, and even goes as far as
specifying that the packaging of all tobacco products must be a
particular color—“drab dark brown”— with a matte finish.8 The
law also prohibits the use of trademarks or other distinguishing
characteristics and stipulates that the “brand, business or company
name, or variant name (if any), for the tobacco products” may only
appear in a prescribed place and form, alongside any other marks
permitted by the Act’s regulation. 9 The Australian government
claimed that enacting the legislation was in the interest of
improving public health.10 It argued that despite the high level of
regulation in place prior to the enactment of the plain packaging
law, more than 15,000 Australians die of tobacco-related diseases
each year, costing AUS$31.5 billion per annum.11
A challenge against the law’s constitutionality was denied by
the High Court of Australia in 2012. 12 The law is currently
purposes with respect to the convergence of cases in both the international
investment law regime and that of the WTO as well as the trend towards
convergence of regulatory space in both fields. This article will not fully analyze
the proceedings under either regime. On the convergence of the two fields, see
generally Jürgen Kurtz, On the Evolution and Slow Convergence of International Trade
and Investment Law, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Trade
and Investment Law: Institutional Differences and Substantive Similarities, 9 JERUSALEM
REV. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Tomer Broude, Toward an Economic Approach to the
Consolidation of International Trade Regulation and International Investment Law, 9
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 24 (2014); Donald McRae, The World Trade
Organization and International Investment Law: Converging Systems – Can the Case
for Convergence Be Made?, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 13 (2014).
7 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
8 Id. §§ 18, 19.
9 Id. §§ 18–20.
10 Explanatory Memorandum, Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth), 1
(Nicola Roxon, Minister for Health and Ageing) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgibin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/bill_em/tppb2011190.pdf.
11 Id.
12
JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.) available at
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgmentsummaries/2012/projt-2012-08-15.pdf. The original ruling was made on August
15, 2012. For the full judgment made on October 5, 2012, see id. at 1, 6, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/43.html.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

REGULATORY SPACE

7

undergoing scrutiny before two international dispute settlement
systems: the WTO and an international investment tribunal.13 In
the case of the former, a number of WTO members initiated the
action against Australia.14 In the case of the latter, Philip Morris
Asia Limited brought a suit against Australia under the Bilateral
Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between Hong Kong and Australia.15
Under both processes, the claimants argue, inter alia, that the
Australian government’s measure infringes trademark rights.16 In

13 See generally the contributions in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF
CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012).
14 It should be noted that with the exception of Cuba and Indonesia, none of
the complainants are large exporters of tobacco products, and there is little to no
trade between the applicant countries and Australia. Sergio Puig, The Merging of
International Trade and Investment Law, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 6-30 (forthcoming)
(draft on file with author). See generally PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF
CIGARETTES, supra note 13; Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434 (May 5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm; Dispute
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging,
WT/DS435
(May
5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm; Dispute
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging,
WT/DS441
(May
5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds441_e.htm; Dispute
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging,
WT/DS458
(May
5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds458_e.htm;
and
Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging,
WT/DS467
(May
5,
2014), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds467_e.htm).
15 See Letter from Allen Arthur Robinson, Counsel, Philip Morris Asia Ltd.,
to Hon. Robert McClelland MP, Attorney-General for Australia, (Nov. 21, 2011),
available
at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0665.pdf (giving a Notice of Arbitration concerning claims made by
Philip Morris Asia Limited against the Commonwealth of Australia); International
Center for Trade and Sustainability Development, Morris Launches Legal Battle
Over Australian Cigarette Packaging, 15 BRIDGES 1 (June 29, 2011) available at
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/philip-morris-launcheslegal-battle-over-australian-cigarette-packaging.
16 In the case of investment law, trademarks are likely considered to be an
investment under the relevant Hong Kong – Australia BIT. In the case of WTO
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addition, the WTO disputes also allege violations of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”)17 and the GATT
1994.18
Regardless of the venue, the cases invariably involve a
discussion of the ability of governments to regulate in the field of
human health.19 These cases essentially deal with the amount of
regulatory space that governments have under both international

law, the applicants claim a violation of Articles 20 and 15(4) of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and
Article 7 of the Paris Convention. For an instructive overview of intellectual
property rights in international investment law with specific reference to the plain
packaging measures of both Australia and Uruguay, see Bryan Mercurio,
Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment
Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 871 (2012) and Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy
Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property (New York University School of Law Public
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-53, 1, 24 et
seq.,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503135.
17 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17tbt.pdf. This section outlines the pertinent legal questions surrounding the
regulatory space according to WTO members within disputes concerning the SPS
Agreement and the TBT Agreement.
18 Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434 (May 5, 2014), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm.
The
importance of these proceedings in the WTO context is evidenced by the
unusually high number of WTO members that have joined the dispute as third
parties. See generally Tobacco Plain Packaging – Investor-State Arbitration,
AUSTRALIAN
GOV’T,
ATT’Y-GEN.
DEP’T,
http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging.
19 A procedural obstacle to the investment arbitration claim presented by
Philip Morris Asia consists in the fact that it did not become the sole shareholder
of Philip Morris Australia Limited until after the government of Australia
announced that it would proceed with its plain packaging plan. This likely
precludes Philip Morris Asia from arguing that it had legitimate expectations that
its trademarks would not be affected by the plain packaging legislation. See
generally AUSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE OF ARBITRATION, ¶ 5, (Dec. 21, 2011),
available
at
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Documents/A
ustralias%20Response%20to%20the%20Notice%20of%20Arbitration%2021%20Dec
ember%202011.pdf.
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trade and investment law.
In the past, these two fields of international economic law had
divergent approaches towards the amount of regulatory autonomy
governments possessed. This jurisprudential bifurcation has not
been problematic so far.
However, with the initiation of
proceedings in two different dispute settlement systems regarding
the exact same governmental measure, the question of how much
regulatory space governments should be afforded under each
international regime takes on crucial importance. 20 One could
argue that states should foresee situations in which a subsequent
treaty that allows for less regulatory space supersedes an earlier
treaty. However, this assumes that the restrictions on regulatory
space concern the same subject matter, which is not necessarily the
case. The starting point is quite different in the case of trade and
investment law, although there may be overlap, as the case of plain
packaging of cigarettes shows. This may be due to a different
regulatory regime with respect to the same subject matter, due to
the two regimes having been designed to be complementary, but it
turns out that they are not, or – even more problematically – in
situations in which the rules of one regime undermine the
application of the other regime.21
The increasing importance of so-called Global Value Chains
(GVCs) shows the interdependence of these two fields. 22 As
pointed out by the 2013 report of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), because of the inextricable
20
Divergence in the interpretation of different (or even similar) treaty
language is not a new phenomenon. Moreover, coherence between different
international regimes is not required, as the debate on the fragmentation of
international law shows.
See generally International Law Commission,
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law: Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, at 253, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Martti Koskenniemi).
21 One example of the latter concerns countermeasures that are legal under
WTO law, but are illegal under investment law. Junianto James Losari & Michael
Ewing-Chow, Decentralization, Due Process and Disputes: Indonesia's Recent
Experiences with IIAs and Investor-State Disputes, J. World Inv. & Trade (2015)
(forthcoming) (on file with author); Puig, supra note 14, at 24.
22
On global value chains in general, see generally UNCTAD, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR
DEVELOPMENT 122 (2013); IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS FOR TRADE,
INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND JOBS, JOINT REPORT BY THE OECD, WTO, &
UNCTAD 19 (Aug. 6, 2013).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

10

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:1

linkage between trade and investment in GVCs, “it is crucial to
ensure coherence between investment and trade policies,” as
“inconsistent policies weaken the effectiveness of GVC-related
policies and can ultimately be self-defeating.”23
Finally, the potential of the two dispute settlement systems to
decide that countries have different degrees of regulatory
autonomy may undermine the ability of governments to
predictably regulate public health and environmental issues. This
is especially the case when the disputes involve a challenge to the
same governmental measure in two systems that do not regulate
the same subject matter. Having at least similar regulatory space
increases efficiency and reduces costs that governments and the
private sector otherwise incur. The importance of this matter
cannot be overstated with respect to the plain packaging
legislation. A number of countries plan to institute similar
regulations to those of Australia and are awaiting the outcome of
these disputes.24 Even more importantly, the number of cases in
which the regulatory fabric of countries is being challenged can be
expected to increase in the near future.
After briefly discussing the common origins of international trade
and investment law (2), this article introduces the legal
frameworks of both regimes and shows that there is a trend
towards convergence with respect to the regulatory autonomy
governments have when making public policy decisions (3). The
article then provides reasons for the existing differences in how
both fields approach the question of regulatory autonomy through
an analysis of the different textual, contextual and institutional
design, as well as the different epistemic communities prevalent in
trade and investment law (4). The final section offers concluding
remarks (5).

UNCTAD, supra note 22, at 190 et seq.
Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’ Smoking
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1.
23

24
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2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: TWINS SEPARATED AT BIRTH
Over the last twenty years, the interest in international
investment law has intensified, shown not only by the increasing
number of international investment agreements (“IIAs”), but also
by the increasing number of cases that are being adjudicated. 25
This rising interest is similar to the one observed in international
trade law, following the creation of the WTO in 1995.
The two fields are closely interrelated and many modern
preferential trade agreements contain not only rules with respect to
trade, but also rules pertaining to investment.26 Examples can be
found in the ongoing negotiations about the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP)27 as well as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 28 Both areas fall under the
purview of public international law,29 as the underlying treaties are
See infra notes 41 et seq. and accompanying text.
See generally Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, The Design
of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, R. INT’L ORGS. 1, 6
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141141.
27 One overview of the current status is provided by the Office of the US
Trade Representative. Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. The TPP has been the subject of intense
debate; see generally Paul Krugman, No Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A23.
28 The TTIP has led to discussions on transparency in treaty negotiations, as
well as with regard to the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement. For
insight into the former issue, see generally Bernd Lange, TTIP Debate Suffering
from
Lack
of
Transparency,
THE
PARLIAMENT
(Oct.
31,
2014),
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/ttip-debate-sufferinglack-transparency. On the issue of investor-state dispute settlement and the
impact on the European Commission’s policy space, see generally Javier García
Olmedo, ISDS: Which Way Will the Scales TTIP?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct.
3, 2014), available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/03/isdswhich-way-will-the-scales-ttip/.
29
Indeed, the first ICSID case appeared to indicate that direction. Asian
Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Final Award, 526, 557 (June 27, 1990). See generally Charles N. Brower, W(h)ither
International Commercial Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 181, 187 (2008); and
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill
ed., 2010). But see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law:
Why Competition Among International Economic Tribunals Is Not Working, 59
HASTINGS L. J. 241, 241–46 (2007).
25
26
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entered into by states. In both instances, states play a central role
in the enforcement of adjudicatory decisions. 30 Similarly, both
entities have seen a remarkable increase in interest: in the case of
international trade law, this became evident in the aftermath of the
creation of the WTO in 1995; in the case of international investment
law, it has grown through a sharp increase in the number of IIAs as
well as through an increase in dispute settlement based on these
agreements.31
There are nevertheless a considerable number of differences.32
World trade law is based on a set of mostly multilateral treaties
(with a small number of so-called plurilateral treaties) that prohibit
discriminatory treatment regarding foreign and domestic like
goods and services (so-called “national treatment obligation”), and
also with respect to distinguishing between like products or
services that come from different countries (so-called “mostfavored nation obligation”). In the context of the Uruguay Round,
a number of additional agreements have been developed with
respect to intellectual property, subsidies, dumping, agriculture,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to
trade.
This system is buttressed by a dispute settlement
mechanism – the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) –
often referred to as one of the most effective international
enforcement mechanisms. States in WTO disputes oftentimes
serve as proxies for private actors on both sides of any dispute.
International investment law is characterized by states
guaranteeing the protection of foreign investors through rules
pertaining to fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination
based on the origin of the investor and compensation in the case of
expropriations in exchange for foreign direct investments. 33
30 Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained
Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006).
31
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, 100 (2000). For a more detailed overview of the
parallels and differences between the two fields, see generally Puig, supra note 14,
at 6-13.
32
See generally Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and
Comparative Public Law – An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 3, 10–17 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
33
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P.
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
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Contrary to WTO law, there is no need for investors to convince
their home countries to bring a case, but rather international
investment treaties allow for the investor to bring a claim against
the host state, without having to exhaust local remedies, before ad
hoc arbitral tribunals. Procedurally, such panels more closely
resemble commercial arbitration tribunals compared to their WTO
counterparts. Investment law is undergoing a marked shift – one
that is commensurate with a shift in the type of case that is being
arbitrated. While early cases mostly concerned expropriation
measures, or questioned discrete sanctions, investors have started
to challenge the regulatory fabric of their host states. 34 As a
corollary, international investment law is becoming increasingly
scrutinized for being potentially unfair to developing countries or,
as some have argued, is perceived as a threat to domestic
governance. This increased interest is not only true for academic
writing; 35 international investment law has also gained a
considerable amount of public attention.
Di Mascio and Pauwelyn summed up the difference between
the two regimes by characterizing the trade regime as being about
“overall welfare, efficiency, liberalization, state-to-state exchanges
of market access, and trade opportunities—not individual rights.”
36
In contrast, investment law is concerned with “fairness
grounded in customary rules on treatment of aliens, not
efficiency.” 37
Furthermore, “[i]t is about protection, not
liberalization, and about individual rights, not state-to-state
exchanges of market opportunities.”38
The development towards challenging not only particular
administrative decisions, but also challenging the domestic
regulatory fabric – and the ability to do so internationally – raises
34 This includes cases concerning higher tariffs for basic utilities, harmful
substances, or general regulatory policies. Schill, supra note 32, at 15.
35
For an excellent overview of the existing literature on international
investment law and its changing nature, see generally Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22
EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 885 (2011).
36
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L.,
48, 54 (2008).
37 Id. at 56.
38 Id.
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new questions about (1) what role private actors should play, (2)
what vehicle is appropriate to challenge domestic regulatory
measures, and (3) to what extent international adjudicatory bodies
should have decision-making authority over domestic policy
preferences such as the protection of human health, the
environment, or human rights. Although international trade and
investment law have different enforcement mechanisms, they both
raise similar questions with respect to the amount of regulatory
space that is accorded to domestic decision-makers. Interestingly
however, these two areas of law appear to have taken divergent
trajectories regarding this question.
This article contributes to the nascent literature on comparing
international trade and investment law.39 Unlike other articles, it
does not attempt to provide a broad comparison between various
fields in international law.40 Rather, it presumes that international
trade and investment law are sufficiently close to warrant a
meaningful comparison. This article provides an analysis of the
regulatory space that states and WTO members are provided when

39
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013); DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra
note 36; Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme:
Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law,
14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93 (2013); Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of
Review in International Investment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the
Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013); Jürgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of
WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and Its Discontents, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 749 (2009); Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy Design in International
Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making,
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (2013) available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/2013/04/Solving-Global-Problems.CLE-ReadingMaterials.Panel-III.pdf; Elizabeth Trujillo, From Here to Beijing: Public/Private
Overlaps in Trade and Their Effects on U.S. Law, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 691; Todd Weiler
& Walid Ben Hamida, Intersections: Dissemblance or Convergence Between
International Trade and Investment Law, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SPECIAL
(2013),
available
at
http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key=36; Roger P. Alford, The
Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration (2013), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=10
18&context=globalevents&type=additional; RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL
GOVERNANCE (2010); and TRADE AND INVESTMENT RULE-MAKING: THE ROLE OF
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS (Stephen Woolcock ed., 2006).
40
Roberts, supra note 39; Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in
International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 546 (2014).
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appearing before international investment law panels and WTO
dispute settlement organs. The degree of regulatory space
governments possess is important. On one hand, an abundance of
regulatory space may undermine the efficacy of the discipline of
international investment law or international trade law. On the
other hand, limiting the regulatory autonomy of governments too
drastically allows international adjudicators to nullify domestic
decisions without any form of democratic control. Given that
international trade and investment law are closely related, and are
used to challenge administrative and regulatory decisions, it is
surprising that there is a disconnect between these two fields with
respect to the amount of regulatory space that states have at their
disposal.
3. THE WTO AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORKS COMPARED
3.1. Introducing the Legal Frameworks
This section compares the different frameworks that WTO law
and international investment law employ and highlight important
differences in the application of the legal frameworks.41 Regime
comparison is not a particularly novel undertaking, having been
employed in a number of areas in international law. Nevertheless,
some argue that international investment law belongs in a category
of its own as “[i]t is not a sub-genre of an existing discipline. It is
dramatically different from anything previously known in the
international sphere.” 42 While this statement was made in the
context of a beginning – though quickly burgeoning – practice of
enforcing investor rights through investment arbitration,
international investment law is being regarded by a number of
authors as sui generis.43 Of course, the same was said of the WTO
41 The article is based on an understanding of WTO law and investment law
as forming part of public international law. While they may deviate from general
international law rules in some instances (taking on the character of ius specialis
under Article 55 of the Articles on State Responsibility), both fields are either
firmly grounded in public international law or have developed into belonging in
this field. Vadi & Gruszczynski, supra note 39, at 617.
42 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995).
43 Roberts, supra note 39, at 94; Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 151, 152–53 (2004). For a
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after its creation of 1995.44
Recent developments make such a comparison even more apt.
A number of trade agreements are now more encompassing,
including not only provisions pertaining to trade, but also
provisions pertaining to investment. Both areas are increasingly
regarded as two sides of the same coin.45
This section will outline the basic structures of (a) international
investment law and (b) international trade law. Historically
speaking, both fields are of relatively recent origin. The WTO’s
predecessor formed part of the post–WWII attempt to regulate
international finance, development, and trade through the Bretton
Woods institutions, and was later supplanted and considerably
expanded through the creation of the WTO in 1995. While
international investment law was created in the aftermath of WWII
as well, it did not fully form as a more developed field until after
the end of the Cold War.46
There are a number of areas where analogies have been drawn
between international trade and investment law. This has become
evident in a number of investment cases in which the panels used
counterpoint, see Martins Paparinskis, Analogies and Other Regimes of International
Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY
INTO PRACTICE 73, 73 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014).
44 Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92
VA. L. REV. 251, 259 (2006); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the
WTO: Rules Are Rules–Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 341
(2000).
45
Some states are including investment protections within bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements. For an example, see generally North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289; Association of Southeast
Asian Nations [ASEAN] Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009,
available
at
http://www.asean.org/images/2013/resources/publication/2012%20%20ACIA%20An%20Introduction%20(Apr).pdf.
Some
multilateral
trade
agreements also incorporate provisions on investment. For examples of such
agreements, see Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures and General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); Debra P.
Steger, International Trade and Investment: Towards a Common Regime?, in PROSPECTS
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 156, 160 et seq. (Roberto Echandi
& Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013).
46 José Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING
TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 15 (M. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010) (stating that ”[t]he 1990s,
not the 1980s and certainly not the 1970s, were the era when the modern
investment regime was born.”).
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previous decisions on “likeness” or national treatment or
procedural decisions on amicus curiae briefs in the WTO context.47
3.1.1. The Investment Law Framework
International investment protection originally developed
largely in conjunction with trade agreements and oftentimes
contained provisions that guaranteed wide-ranging protection of
the property of nationals of one party in the territory of the other
party. 48 Additional, and sometimes successful, avenues for
protection included diplomatic protection at the discretion of the
home state, ad hoc commissions, arbitral tribunals, recourse to
local courts, or contractual agreements with the host state.49 This
remained largely unchanged until after WWII. Until then, the
protection was based on an emerging body of mostly bilateral
trade agreements and customary international law.50
The increasing interchange of capital after WWII, as opposed to
the previous practice of property protection,51 allowed the field of
international investment law to emerge.
Capital exporting
countries, as proxies for capital providers, were however interested

47
Roberts, supra note 39, at 52. See generally the contributions in WTO
LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jorge
Alberto Huerta-Goldman et al. eds., 2013); Alford, supra note 39, at 35 et seq.;
Trujillo, supra note 39, at 713 et seq.; Kurtz, supra note 39, at 752-55.
48 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 36, at 52; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief
History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157,
159 (2005–2006).
49 Lionel M. Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 1, 411 (1972). These measures were almost exclusively ex post facto measures. For
further analyses of the history of the protection of the property interests of aliens,
Douglas, supra note 43, at 151; EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1916).
Some of these dispute settlement mechanisms were carried out by mutual
agreement between the parties, others involved pressure by one of the states
involved.
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 9 (2009).
50 For a more complete history, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at
3-18.
51
At the time, a conceptual shift is said to have taken place, one from
protection of property to investment protection, which also took account of the
need of economic development for developing countries. Id. at 21.
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in obtaining assurances that investment protection was to be put
on a more secure footing than the previous mechanisms that were
oftentimes of an ad hoc nature. This started with the first BIT,
which was concluded in 1959 between Pakistan and Germany.52
The system grew slowly, but steadily from 72 investment
agreements at the end of the 1960s, to 165 at the end of the 1970s,
and 385 at the end of the 1980s,53 when a number of European
countries pursued BITs with developing countries. 54 This was
partially due to the adoption of the New International Economic
Order, which signaled a push towards revising the international
economic system by developing countries.55 It is also worth noting
that a number of developing countries remained on the sidelines of
this development. For example, China did not conclude its first
BIT until 1982, and neither Brazil nor India did so until 1994.56 The
real change these treaties brought about came through allowing
private parties – on the basis of BITs – to have recourse against
discriminatory treatment, the prohibition of export-related import
quotas, or the repatriation of income in convertible currencies. The
ability to challenge state measures on these grounds was seen as
the creation of a “dramatic extension of arbitral jurisdiction in the
international realm.”57
By the end of the millennium the number of BITs had reached a
total of 1,857 with other capital exporting countries having
52 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (Ger. &
Pak.).
53 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Bilateral Investment
Treaties,
1959–1999,
1
(2000),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
54
See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24
INT’L. LAW. 655, 655 (1990).
55 See generally G.A. Res. 6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).
For an overview of the differing political views of countries, see Andrew T.
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 646–51 (1998).
56 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at 43–44.
57 Paulsson, supra note 42, at 233; Christoph Schreuer, Paradigmenwechsel im
Internationalen Investitionsrecht, PARADIGMENWECHSEL IM VÖLKERRECHT ZUR
JAHRTAUSENDWENDE 237 et seq. (Waldemar Hummer ed., 2002). Providing a
critical view of the system, GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008).
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undertaken BIT programs.58 That number grew to just over 2,800
BITs by the end of 2010.59 Additionally, a considerable number of
trade agreements contain investment chapters, bringing the total
number to well over 3,000 instruments.60 Importantly, the number
of new investment agreements has grown with such rapidity due
to the fact that they are no longer concluded solely between
developed and developing countries, as the old boundary between
capital exporting and capital importing countries has broken
down.
Since the first investor-state dispute filed under a BIT in 1987,
the number of cases has been rising constantly, amounting to 450
cases by the end of 2011.61 Moreover, according to UNCTAD, 2011
saw the highest number of cases brought in one year, showing the
dynamic nature of dispute settlement in this area. ICSID remains
the focal point for investor-state arbitration.62
While investment law was previously confined to being
grounded in customary international law, 63 it has now firmly
evolved into a field that is – at least with respect to its basis –

58
See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION (2010). By mid-1996, only Botswana,
Guatemala, Ireland, Mozambique, Myanmar and Suriname had not concluded a
BIT. Guzman, supra note 55, at 640.
59 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 31, at
100.
60 Id.
61 Note that this number may not reflect all disputes submitted under BITs,
as not all cases are necessarily public. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1
(Apr. 2012),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf.
62 See id. at 2. For a breakdown of the ICSID cases, see The ICSID Caseload –
Statistics, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 7
(2012),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&ac
tionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English31.
The
total number of cases registered with ICSID from 1972 until the end of 1996
amounted to 38. 2011 alone saw 38 newly registered cases with ICSID, with the
total number of cases between 1997 and 2011 being 331, subsequent to the
inclusion of provisions into BITs that committed host states to investor–state
arbitration in the 1990s.
63 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19
(3d ed. 2010) (“Both views were premised on the idea that law should be designed
to further the free movement of trade and investments across state boundaries.”).
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characterized by treaty law. 64 The vast majority of investment
treaties are bilateral – with regional agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or sectoral agreements
such as the Energy Charter Treaty or the Lomé III and IV
conventions constituting rare exceptions.65 Given the lack of an
overarching institutional framework, 66 it is not surprising that a
coherent direction is – at least so far – lacking. Unlike the WTO’s
Appellate Body (“AB”), 67 investment arbitration panels are not
guided by the jurisprudence of a higher adjudicatory level. And
yet, despite the bilateral nature of the field, there appear to be early
signs of convergence given that many of the BITs are based on socalled model BITs which provide – at least for some states – a
blueprint, with some deviation depending on the country’s
counterpart.68 Moreover, the vast majority of BITs or multilateral
investment treaties contain a number of common provisions.
While the “repetition of common clauses in bilateral treaties does
not create or support an inference that those clauses express
customary law,” 69 there is growing evidence that certain

See supra Section I.
For an overview of the procedural requirements in these conventions, see
Paulsson, supra note 42, at 241–54.
66 Repeated attempts at creating a multilateral investment framework have
failed. Rainer Geiger, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons from
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 94, (2002); EDWARD
M. GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVISTS AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 15–49 (2000).
67
Despite the arguably existing hierarchy, panels for a long time have
deviated considerably from the guidance of the AB in SPS Agreement cases. See
Markus Wagner, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages of Law and Science in WTO
Proceedings, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 194 et seq. (2011).
68 For the relevant literature, see Schill, supra note 35, at 892 et seq. See also
what is arguably a convergence in the model BITs of China and the U.S., albeit
from different directions, Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New
Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 73 (2007); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S.
Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008–2009, 283 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed.,
2009); Cai Congyan, China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty
Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L. ECON. L.
457 (2009).
69 Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 126
(1984). This is not merely an expression of academic sentiment, but was a position
the ICJ already expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
64
65
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fundamental rules and principles can be discerned from the
existing treaty law and investment jurisprudence.70
Anthea Roberts helpfully identifies three stages in the
development of international investment law:
the system’s
infancy, its adolescence, and its approaching adulthood.71 The first
stage is characterized by power imbalances between developing
states and developed states, the latter of which exported its capital
to the former and could oftentimes dictate the terms of the
agreement. While they were reciprocal in nature, in practice the
large majority of such relationships were characterized by strong
power imbalances and the belief that only through such treaties
could developing countries attract much-needed capital. 72
Investors were given protections from expropriations or other
measures that could inhibit their investments. Procedurally, the
broadly worded obligations were accompanied by mechanisms
that allowed investors to bring disputes before arbitral tribunals,
which were given wide discretion to decide over such disputes. As
Roberts points out, the “net result was a considerable shift of
interpretive power away from the treaty parties and toward
investment tribunals, leading to investment treaty law being
developed through a body of de facto precedents.” 73 The
community of arbitrators being small and to a large extent coming
from commercial arbitration was another characteristic of this
phase.74 This led to the mindset that was prevalent in commercial
arbitration (of regarding the two parties as being on equal footing)
without due regard for the different roles that states and investors
actually play. 75 Finally, the treaties were structurally skewed
70
See generally STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009).
71 Roberts, supra note 39, at 75–93. For a slightly different classification, see
Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 158 et seq.
72 SORNARAJAH, supra note 63, at 19.
73 Roberts, supra note 39, at 77.
74 Additional factors included that arbitral institutions were deeply vested in
commercial or investor-state contractual arbitration, thus favoring arbitrators with
whom they were familiar. Given that these institutions were involved in
commercial arbitration, it is no surprise that they would choose from among the
same rosters of arbitrators. Brower, supra note 29, at 190 et seq.; Thomas W.
Wälde, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English–Speaking Section of the
Centre for Studies and Research, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
63, 114–15 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Wälde eds., 2007).
75 William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, The Need for Public Law
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towards investor rights and rarely contained solid provisions that
would safeguard the interests of states in defending regulatory
changes. The protection of pursuing domestic policy goals –
coming to the fore in recent years – was hardly mentioned in these
treaties. This is understandable, given that the capital-exporting
country was generally not concerned with such issues in the
capital-importing country. The greater concern with investor
rights becomes evident when looking at some of the early (and
even today’s) literature that emphasizes the parallel between
investment law and human rights law. 76 It is important to
emphasize in this context that – barring certain rights – such rights
are not absolute, but in most instances are subject to limitations.77
In a number of cases, panels found that – based on the assumption
that investment treaties exist to “create and maintain favorable
conditions for investments,” – resolution of uncertainties should
result “so as to favor the protection of covered investments.”78

Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 689, 691 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); Bruno
Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); Moshe Hirsch, Investment Tribunals and Human Rights:
Divergent Paths, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 97, 108 et seq. (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
76
Geneviève Burdeau, Nouvelles perspectives pour l’arbitrage dans le
contentieux économique intéressant les États, 1995 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 3, 15
(1995) (Fr.); Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate:
Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor–State
Arbitration, 15 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 223, 241 (2012); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel,
Enterprise v. State: The New David and Goliath?, 23 ARB. INT’L 93, 104 (2007);
ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 7-8 (2009).
Douglas relies on the European Court of Human Rights on the one hand and the
jurisprudence of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal on the other. The latter is a
tribunal whose creation was based on a bilateral agreement between both states
and while its jurisprudence is often cited, one can question whether its existence is
truly evidence for such an alleged parallel. See Steven Ratner, Regulatory Takings
in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 499 (2008). For a similar approach, see Jarrod Hepburn, The
Duty to Give Reasons for Administrative Decisions in International Law, 61 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 641, 655 (2012).
77 See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950.
78 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116
(Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). See generally Michael Waibel,
International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO
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It is also prudent to be aware of the different goals of human
Although
rights protection and investment protection.
asymmetries in the power relations between states and individuals
exist in both investment law and human rights law,79 and although
human rights treaties very often include provisions relating to the
protection of property rights, the procedural and substantive
provisions in human rights treaties are considerably different from
those found in investment law treaties. This not only includes the
different location of human rights law and investment law along
the public / private divide.80 It also includes the observation that
unlike the reciprocal obligations a state enters into in investment
law, the obligations in human rights law “reflect fundamental
values of the international community.”81 A second observation is
that granting legal protection to investors finds justification from a
state’s desire to attract investments by non-state actors.82
According to Roberts, international investment law is
undergoing significant change, as the importance of private law
considerations and investor interests diminishes in favor of greater
regulatory space for states. 83 Investments from developing
countries have increased, causing existing developed states to lose
the immunity from suit they once factually enjoyed. Capital flows

SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 29, 39-40 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2011).
On the other hand, see decisions that favor the application of the principle of in
dubio pro mitius, such as SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic
Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, 8 ICSID Rep. 451 (2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. and
Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award, ¶ 160 et seq. (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005). See generally Schill,
supra note 70, at 314–19.
79 Hirsch, supra note 75, at 98; Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 80.
80 Hirsch, supra note 75, at 107.
81
See id. at 109-10 (explaining that international human rights and
investment law have different characteristics). An additional factor to consider is
that the traditional power relationship between states and investors, in which the
state assumed the dominant role, may not always be true in certain circumstances,
which may actualize in the negotiations of concessions and stabilization clauses.
Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 81. See also Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer,
Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (Pierre Marie Dupuy,
Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersman eds., 2009).
82 Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 80.
83 Roberts, supra note 39, at 78.
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are no longer uni-directional, leaving states that had previously
considered themselves immune from such suits open to investment
arbitration.84 Developed states are now being called upon more
frequently to defend their own policy decisions before arbitral
tribunals. Moreover, an increasing number of cases are no longer
concerned with discrete matters that can be decided without
exerting considerable influence on public policy in areas such as
public utilities, the environment, or public health.85 The decreasing
immunity from suit experienced by developed countries and the
resulting public policy implications, together with what is
perceived to be an investor-friendly jurisprudence, have led some
countries to rethink their commitments to the enterprise of
international investment arbitration.86 Some states (such as Bolivia,
Ecuador and Venezuela) have taken the rather aggressive step of
withdrawing from the ICSID dispute settlement system entirely,87
while other countries (such as South Africa and Australia) have
decided to no longer include investor-state arbitration provisions

84
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South–South
Cooperation
in
International
Investment
Arrangements
6
et
seq.,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3 (2005). See also José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future
Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 634 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al.
eds., 2011) (“More countries than ever before are . . . capital exporters as well as
capital importers.”).
85
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, IIA ISSUES
NOTE, NO. 1, 2012: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2,
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10 (Apr. 16, 2012).
86
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State
Dispute
Settlement
and
Impact
on
Investment
Rulemaking,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007), at 92.
87
ICSID, News Release, Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the
ICSID
Convention
(Jan.
26,
2012),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements
&pageName=Announcement100; ICSID, News Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice
Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, (July 9, 2009), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&p
ageName=Announcement20; ICSID, News Release, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, (May 16, 2007), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&p
ageName=Announcement3.
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in their IIAs.88
Roberts projects changes to international investment law on the
basis of these developments in a number of distinct, yet
interrelated, areas. She identifies a shift in the interpretative
balance of power towards states, and away from investment
tribunals. 89 One major reason for this shift is the diminishing
divide between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries.
Whereas certain investment treaty provisions had almost
exclusively benefitted developed countries in the past, they may
now work to the detriment of these countries. As a result, Roberts
expects clarifications and changes to the content of such provisions
in future IIAs.90 She predicts that the system’s trajectory is one
that places more “attention on the state as a treaty party and
regulatory sovereign,” while on the other hand “those that draw
comparisons with private law or that narrowly focus on the
importance of investor protections are declining in value.”91 If this
prediction holds true, it would very much follow in the footsteps of
international trade law, which also saw a maturing from an initial
stage in which non-trade law considerations were incorporated
rather restrictively,92 to one which recognizes these elements and
substantively no longer treats non-trade concerns in “clinical
isolation.”93
International investment dispute adjudication is another area of
investment law that is undergoing significant change due to the
diversification of its participants. What was previously a rather
88
Leon Trakman, Choosing Domestic Courts over Investor-State Arbitration:
Australia’s Repudiation of the Status Quo, 35 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 979 (2012).
89 Roberts, supra note 39, at 78. William W. Park similarly describes the
whole undertaking of arbitration – commercial and investment arbitration – as
being in an autumnal stage, positively connoted. William W. Park, Arbitration in
Autumn, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 287 (2011).
90 Roberts, supra note 39, at 78.
91 Id.
92 STEFAN ZLEPTNIG, NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN WTO LAW: JUSTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF GATT, GATS, SPS AND TBT AGREEMENTS 107–09 (2010); Ingo
Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX
GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1111, 1116 et
seq. (2011).
93
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US – Gasoline
Appellate Body Report].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

26

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:1

close-knit circle of specialized lawyers with a common background
in commercial arbitration has diversified to include participants
from various academic and professional backgrounds. This
diversified group has also come under public scrutiny to a much
greater extent than in previous stages. 94 Importantly, there is a
change in the perception of what is being arbitrated. International
investment dispute adjudication is no longer limited to illegal
conduct by states in relationships between states and private
investors. Its scope has broadened to adjudication of public
interests by investment tribunals.
The approaching “adulthood” era of the investment treaty
system described in Roberts’ view is about to set in, and it abounds
with uncertainty surrounding its nature.95 Whether the system will
continue its current trajectory away from a private law paradigm
to one that is fully public remains to be seen. The maturing of the
field may lead to changes on both the procedural and substantive
levels. Procedurally, this maturation can bring about a further
increase in the number of amicus curiae briefs or third-party
interventions, especially in cases that concern challenges to a
country’s regulatory fabric that other countries may wish to
emulate. Substantively, the system has the potential to mature to a
stage where disputes are seen as the adjudication of public matters
rather than discrete, individual controversies.
3.1.2. The WTO Framework
The history of the GATT/WTO framework has had a longer
period of maturation since its inception in 1947. In addition, it has
undergone substantive, procedural, and institutional makeovers
through the creation of the WTO in 1995. Negotiations after WWII
led to the provisional adoption of the GATT, pending the
anticipated creation of the International Trade Organization
(ITO). 96 The failure of the establishment of the ITO led to the
GATT being viewed as a quasi-organization, despite Article XXV
Roberts, supra note 39, at 83 et seq.
Id. at 90.
96 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION
JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1998).
94
95
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GATT, which did not accord that status to the GATT regime.
Although the GATT provided a framework for the contracting
parties to conduct eight subsequent trade rounds and to continue
working towards greater liberalization of trade, over time the
existing structure was considered to be insufficient by some parties
to the GATT.97 This resulted in the negotiation of fundamental
changes to the existing system during the Uruguay Round, which
led to the creation of the WTO in 1995.98
The WTO changed the existing international trading system in
a number of important ways. Not only was the subject matter
which fell under the purview of the WTO enlarged, but because of
what is known as the “single-undertaking” approach, WTO
members were no longer able to opt-in to specific agreements
according to their individual preferences. With the exception of
the plurilateral agreements in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement,
membership in the WTO requires future members to abide by all
treaties under the WTO umbrella. Two of the changes brought
about by the creation of the WTO are particularly worth analyzing
in greater detail: the dispute settlement process and the increased
recognition of balancing trade liberalization with other important
societal values and interests.
The conclusion of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
brought about several important changes to the dispute settlement
mechanism, as it had existed under the GATT. Article 3.3 DSU
points to the dual nature of WTO law, stating that “[t]he prompt
settlement of [disputes] is essential to the effective functioning of
the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the
rights and obligations of Members.”99
The compulsory nature of dispute settlement under Article 23.1
DSU serves another function – the provision of “security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system.”100 While dispute
settlement can take on a variety of forms (including good offices,

Id. at 24.
See generally The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (19861992) (Terence Stewart ed., 1993).
99 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 3(3), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 425 [hereinafter DSU].
100 Id. art. 3.3.
97

98
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conciliation, mediation, 101 and arbitrations 102 ), the default option
today is adjudication by panels and the AB subsequent to
mandatory consultations.103
Once adjudication commences, the dispute comes before a
panel, and appeals of panel decisions are brought before the AB.
The panel or AB report is adopted by the DSB quasi-automatically
through a reverse or “negative” consensus – the report is adopted
unless a party to the dispute notifies the DSB of its decision to
appeal (for panel reports), or the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt it.104 This is one of the essential differences between the DSU
dispute settlement mechanism and the previous GATT regime,
under which an affirmative consensus, including a vote from the
losing party, was required to adopt a report.105
Another important change brought about by the emergence of
the WTO is the very existence of an appellate mechanism, through
the creation of the AB. While disputing WTO members can choose
the members of the panels,106 AB members are appointed by the
DSB to serve four-year terms, with a possible one-time
reappointment. 107 Although not envisioned as playing an
important role at the outset, 108 the AB’s role changed rather
dramatically from “an afterthought to a centrepiece” of the WTO
dispute settlement system.109 The AB consists of seven members

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 25.
103 Id. arts. 4, 6-20.
104 For examples of reverse or negative consensus provisions relating to the
adoption of panel reports and AB reports by the DSB, see id. arts. 16(4), 17(14).
105 HUDEC, supra note 2; Andreas Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment, Remedies
Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 480
(1994).
106 See DSU, supra note 99, arts. 8.6, 8.7. A significant number of panelists are
now being determined by the WTO Director-General, particularly in situations in
which the disputing members are unable to agree on the composition of the
panels. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 214 (3d ed. 2013).
107 DSU, supra note 99, art. 17.2.
108 See generally Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the
Preparatory Committee for the WTO Approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10
February 1995, ¶¶ 11 et seq., WT/DSB/1 (June 19, 1995).
109
Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO
Appellate Body and its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO
101
102
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and appeals are heard by three-member divisions selected on a
rotational basis, which takes into account the principles of random
selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all members to
serve regardless of their origin. 110 The importance of the fixedterm appointments for AB members should not be underestimated.
It provides a level of impartiality that allows for the AB to make
decisions without needing to be concerned about reappointment to
a subsequent dispute.111 Decisions related to an appeal are made
exclusively by the three-member division to which it has been
assigned. However, to “ensure consistency and coherence in its
case law and to draw on the individual and collective expertise of
all seven Members, the division responsible for deciding an appeal
exchanges views with the other Members on issues raised by the
appeal” prior to rendering a final decision.112 The purpose of this
discussion is in line again with the general goal of dispute
settlement in the WTO: to achieve “security and predictability in
the multilateral trading system.”113
Another change brought about by the existence of the AB is the
precedential value of AB decisions with respect to subsequent
panel decisions. While the decisions of panels and the AB are
technically binding only on the parties to a dispute, the
development in the jurisprudence has unofficially established an
adjudicatory system with precedential value. In one of its earliest
decisions, the AB explained that “adopted panel reports are an
important part of the GATT acquis” and should be taken into
account when they are relevant to a dispute because they are
“often considered by subsequent panels” and they “create
legitimate expectations among WTO members.”114 This position
was reinforced several years later, with the AB stating that it
TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 289 (Giorgio
Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).
110 Appellate Body Working Paper, Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
rule 6, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010).
111 The ability of reappointment after four years is somewhat concerning in
this respect. An alternative could consist of a one-time appointment with a term
of six years.
112 VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 106, at 260.
113 DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2.
114
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
AT
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“would have expected the Panel” to consider the AB’s reasoning
from a prior report, because the AB report was intended to
“provid[e] interpretative guidance for future panels.”115
The culmination of this development in jurisprudence
solidifying the precedential value of AB decisions was US – Steel,
in which the AB laid out its view on the binding nature of AB
decisions:
“WTO members attach significance to reasoning
provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports,” which
are “often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute
settlement proceedings” and “relied upon by panels and the
Appellate Body in subsequent disputes.” 116 It then expressed its
deep concern “about the Panel’s decision to depart from wellestablished Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the
interpretation of the same legal issues” and went on to state that
“[t]he Panel’s approach has serious implications for the proper
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system.”117 Moreover,
the AB supported this argument by mentioning what appears
almost obvious: it would be difficult to realize “the hierarchical
structure contemplated in the DSU,” which provides for appellate
review by the AB of panel decisions, without assigning some sort
of precedential value to AB decisions.118 Indeed, the AB may have
even issued an implied threat towards the panels when it
poignantly suggested that the panel’s decision not to follow the AB
jurisprudence constituted a “[failure] to discharge its duties under
Article 11 DSU.”119 This form of de facto precedent has paved the
way for the elucidation of overarching principles in the
jurisprudence of the AB, 120 which is at least by and large now
115 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 107,
WT/DS8/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). See also Appellate Body Report, United States –
Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from
Argentina, ¶ 188, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004) (stating furthermore that
“following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in earlier disputes is not only
appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially where the
issues are the same”).
116 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008).
117 Id. ¶ 162.
118 Id. ¶ 161.
119 Id. ¶ 162.
120 David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of
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followed by the panels.121
A second change concerning dispute settlement from the era of
the GATT to the current system under the WTO lies in the different
normative environment between the two eras. 122
Dispute
settlement under the GATT was consistently regarded as a more
formal exercise in diplomacy123 and procedures were only changed
towards a more formalized legal order in the 1980s with the
creation of the legal division in the GATT secretariat. Nevertheless,
the traditional paradigm under the GATT prior to 1995 remained
“embedded liberalism,” a term coined by John Ruggie denoting
that despite the existence of the interventionist welfare state, trade
liberalization was a firmly entrenched paradigm. 124 This meant
that the ethos of trade experts of the first hour remained the
orthodox view in the context of the GATT as an organization,
including its dispute settlement process.
For present purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the
GATT from the beginning contained justifications for breaches of
other GATT provisions, including justifications under the heading
of general exceptions in Article XX GATT or on the basis of
economic emergencies,125 security concerns,126 regional integration
mechanisms,127 balance of payment concerns, 128 or for reasons of
economic development.129 These rules were supplemented by a

Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 401 (1998).
121 See generally Wagner, supra note 67 (commenting on the debate between
the panels and the AB concerning the SPS Agreement).
122
For the approach taken under the SPS Agreement and the TBT
Agreement, see infra Section II, 2, b.
123 HUDEC, supra note 2 (arguing that the GATT was best characterized as a
“diplomat’s concept of legal order. At least, that is the way it started out”).
124 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982).
125 GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX GATT.
126 GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI GATT.
127 GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV GATT.
128 GATT, supra note 1, art. XII;art. XVIII, Sec. B GATT.
129 Committee on Trade and Development, Note by Secretariat: Implementation
of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, ¶ 3,
Oct. 25, 2000, WT/COMTD/W/77; Note by the Secretariat—Addendum: Information
on the Utilisation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, Feb. 7, 2002,
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4.
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system of waivers.130 The justifications under Article XX GATT
serve as an exemption, within limitations, from GATT rules and
concessions concerning the goals otherwise pursued by the GATT,
most prominently the liberalization of trade.
The difference in how Article XX GATT was interpreted prior
to the emergence of the WTO can be attributed not only to a less
politicized process by way of introducing a permanent appellate
mechanism, but also a different conception of the competing
interests. Under the GATT regime, Article XX GATT was
interpreted in a very narrow fashion, creating a standard for
justification that was almost impossible to meet, 131 including in
cases concerning the environment.132
Under the WTO, the AB interpreted the same provisions
differently. The same cannot be said for the panel level, which had
continued the jurisprudence that had previously existed under the
GATT regime. 133 The AB took issue with the interpretation of
Article XX(g) GATT, especially with respect to the term “related
to” and adopted a more lenient standard. Prior to the Gasoline
decision, disagreement arose over the order in which this provision
is to be analyzed. The AB made it clear that the analysis is to be
conducted in two steps: in a first step, panels and the AB examine
a WTO member’s measure under one of the paragraphs (a) – (j),
followed by an analysis of whether the measure’s application is in

130 ISABEL FEICHTNER, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WTO WAIVERS: STABILITY AND
FLEXIBILITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lorand Bartels et al. eds., 2014).
131 Venzke, supra note 92, at 1117.
132
Panel Report, United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada, L/5198-29S/91 (Feb. 22, 1982); Panel Report, Canada—
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Mar.
22, 1998) (finding that the export prohibitions were not justified by Article XX
GATT because they “could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at the
conservation of salmon and herring stocks and rendering effective the restrictions
on the harvesting of these fish”); Panel Report, Thailand—Restrictions on
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990)
(considering Article XX(b) GATT measures “necessary for the protection of
human, animal plant life or health” as the subject of interpretation). These
decisions emphasized the maintenance of a regime of trade liberalization at the
almost total expense of other public policy goals such as those enshrined in Article
XX GATT.
133
See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996).
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accordance with the chapeau of Article XX GATT.134 Importantly,
this clarified the structure of the provision in that the chapeau
exists in order to curb abuse by a WTO member invoking one of
the justifications in Article XX GATT. Understood in this sense, the
statement by the AB that the “General Agreement is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law” makes clear that
WTO law is embedded in a wider system of public international
law.135 A similar chain of events was evident in the US – Shrimp
case, in which the panel similarly exhibited an approach that –
while paying lip service to the “legitimacy of environmental
policies” – saw such policies as “unilateral measures which, by
their nature, could put the multilateral trading system at risk.”136
The AB, similar to its previous decision in US – Gasoline, made
clear what it saw as the purpose of Article XX GATT: allowing for
a justification of measures that may otherwise contravene
provisions such as Articles I, III or XI GATT, while making sure
that such measures are not taken as an “abuse or misuse of a given
kind of exception.”137
The subsequent jurisprudence has followed this line of
thought.138 There is disagreement over the extent to which the AB

134
See generally US — Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93;
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12 2001) [hereinafter EC –
Asbestos Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 139, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report].
135 US — Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93.
136 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 7.60, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp Panel
Report].
137 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 116 (Dec. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp Appellate Body
Report] (finding that “[i]t is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting
countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in
principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing
country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX.
Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article
XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to
apply.”). See ibid., ¶ 121.
138 See, e.g., EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 134; Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 134; Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Various Measures on Beef
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has developed this line of reasoning into a full-fledged
proportionality jurisprudence.139 Be that as it may, it is hard to
contest that the jurisprudence of the AB, which has clearly
expanded the argumentative space for invoking the justifications in
Article XX GATT compared to the approach championed by panels
in the GATT era, would not have developed without either the
institutional change brought about by the adoption of the DSU or
the realization that in an increasingly interdependent world, WTO
members making domestic decisions over matters such as the
protection of health or the environment deserve a certain amount
of regulatory space. Such decisions are not permitted to be made
without limitations, however. This increasingly legalized form of
deciding complex interactions has moved away from the
diplomatic-political origin of the GATT era,140 although remnants
of that system remain.
3.2. Trade Regulation and Regulatory Expropriations: Trade and
Investment Law
Before comparing and contrasting the two fields of
international trade and investment law, it is worth pointing out
that the two fields have, at first sight, distinctly different goals:
international investment law has developed as a protective
mechanism concerning the investments that individuals or
corporations make in a different jurisdiction. International trade
law, on the other hand, has developed by reducing tariffs and
other barriers to trade by curbing protectionism.
A comparison between terms in particular provisions of both
regimes meets considerable challenges, as such terms are
dependent on the overall purpose of the treaty in which they are
found as well as the context of the provision in which they appear.
The concept of regulatory space can be approached from two

Appellate Body Report].
139 Venzke, supra note 92, at 1130.
140 J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on
the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE
191 (2001); Adrian T. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (1998).
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different directions. In the case of international investment law,
regulatory space functions as a justification for an intrusion on
investment guarantees, especially in cases where an investment
may conflict with what the host state considers a desirable public
policy. In the case of international trade law, the justification is
similarly based upon a public policy decision against a
commitment towards other WTO members to reduce barriers to
trade and avoid protectionism.
This section uses the field of regulatory expropriations to
examine the amount of regulatory space countries possess in
international investment law. It then analyzes the regulatory space
WTO members have under two agreements under the WTO
umbrella: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(“SPS Agreement”)141 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (“TBT Agreement”).142
3.2.1. Investment Law: Regulatory Expropriations
International investment law pursues a number of goals,
including the protection of investors and investments as well as the
promotion of general welfare through foreign direct investment.143
Investors demand protection: for example, investments in
infrastructure projects are generally high-risk undertakings and
require the infusion of often considerable capital over a long period
of time and are subject to changing political realities within the
host state. Because of these characteristics, investors expect
141 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf.
142 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter
TBT
Agreement],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.
143 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/06, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004) and Société Générale
de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13,
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 171 (Aug. 6, 2003). Saluka Investments BV v. Czech
Republic, UNCITRAL, ¶ 300 (Mar. 17, 2006). But see Jason Webb Yackee, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (suggesting that bilateral
investment treaties are “unlikely to significantly drive foreign investment”).
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stability with respect to administrative decision-making. 144
Traditional international investment law has placed considerable
emphasis on the protection of these investments, although, as laid
out above, the field is undergoing change at the moment.
3.2.1.1.
The Changing Landscape of Investment
Regulation
As a counterpoint to the protection of investors, more recent
IIAs have incorporated provisions that explicitly recognize the
importance of non-economic factors, such as human, animal plant
life or health or the environment.145 This hints at the recognition of
the need to find a balance between the individual rights of
investors on the one hand and the regulatory needs of societies on
the other.146
The move began initially with the inclusion of provisions in the
preamble to investment agreements, such as those of the Energy
Charter Treaty or the NAFTA. The former recalls “the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its
protocols, and other international environmental agreements with
energy-related aspects.” It recognizes “the increasingly urgent
need for measures to protect the environment, including the
decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and
for internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these

144 Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL
L.J. 64, 80 (2002); Ralf Buckley, International Trade, Investment and Environmental
Regulation: An Environmental Management Perspective, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 101, 117–
18 (1993).
145
See generally NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at 504; Thomas
Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 816–17 (2001);
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 69
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2012); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in
a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037
(2010).
146 Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation Under the ETC and Other
Investment Protection Treaties, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. (2005), available at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf.
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purposes.” 147 The latter contains the following language: the
parties “UNDERTAKE each of the preceding [investment and
trade objectives] in a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation; PRESERVE their flexibility to
safeguard the public welfare; PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN
the
development
and enforcement
of
148
environmental laws and regulations.”
Similarly, the 2012 US Model BIT declares in its preamble that
the other objectives of the BIT are to be achieved “in a manner
consistent with the protection of health, safety and the
environment.”149 In its operative part, Article 12 of the 2012 US
Model BIT, dealing with the environment, is consistent with the
2004 US Model BIT in that recognizes the inappropriateness of
encouraging investment in those instances when it weakens or
reduces environmental protections. 150 It furthermore replicates
language from the 2004 version when it states:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.151
The added language in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT imposes an
affirmative obligation on the parties to ensure that the parties do
not waive or derogate from domestic environmental laws or labor
laws and mandates that the parties “effectively enforce” these
rules.152 A new clause was added that provides the parties with
147 The Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to the Final Act of the European
Energy Charter Conference, pmbl., 40 (Dec. 1994).
148 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (Jan. 1, 1994).
149
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of ___
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art.
12(2), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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more regulatory space (the 2012 U.S. Model BIT uses the term
“discretion”) “with respect to regulatory, compliance,
investigatory, and prosecutorial matters, and to make decisions
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect
to other environmental matters determined to have higher
priorities.”153 This expanded regulatory space is conditioned on
the discretion being exercised in a reasonable manner.
Compared with the 2012 US Model BIT, the 2004 Canadian
Model BIT is more explicit. Article 10 is structurally analogous to
Article XX GATT and Article XIV of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”). The provision states:
1. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between investments or
between investors, or a disguised restriction on
international trade or investment, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting or enforcing measures necessary:
(a) to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible
natural resources.154
Other agreements incorporate the relevant GATT and GATS
rules by way of reference.
In this context, it is important to draw a distinction not only
between direct expropriations and indirect expropriations, 155 but
Id. art. 12(3).
2004 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Agreement Between
Canada and ___ for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 10, available
at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
155 The majority of today’s disputes no longer concern direct expropriations,
but rather indirect expropriations. See generally W. Michael Reisman & Robert D.
Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 115, 118 (2003). See Dolzer, supra note 144, at 66 (stating that “it is not
unreasonable to assume that the legal issues in the foreign investment context
153

154
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also to distinguish compensable expropriations and noncompensable regulation. Non-compensable regulations are often
described as “regulatory takings” or “regulatory deprivations” and
are state actions that are not singular, but rather exemplify
abstract-general rules that are on their face non-discriminatory.156
The present analysis is only concerned with regulatory takings,
which is governmental rule-making that is not normally directed at
an individual investor, but rather is directed at investors that
formulate abstract-general rules applicable to a variety of
circumstances. One recent example of such a governmental rule is
the ban on printing logos onto cigarette packages in order to better
protect public health.157
It is this latter distinction that is important for the purposes of
this comparison. By 1980, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States already provided guidelines with
respect to expropriations in general, developing the concepts of
unreasonable interference, undue delay, and the effective
enjoyment of property as criteria. Section 712 of the Restatement
provides that:
A state is responsible under international law for injury
resulting from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of a
national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose,
or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by
provision for just compensation . . . .158

may, for the time being, be dominated by the definition of expropriation”); see
generally Schreuer, supra note 146, at 5-45.
156 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of
Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984). See generally Ratner, supra note 76,
at 478; L. Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of
International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 293, 294 (2004).
157 See generally Jennifer M. Freedman, Australia Said to Face WTO Complaint
over Tobacco Packaging, Ban on Logos, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:03 AM), available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-05/australia-said-to-face-wtocomplaint-over-ban-on-tobacco-logos.html.
158 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
712(1) (1986) (clarifying that this section applies to direct as well as indirect
expropriations).
Subsection (1) applies . . . to other actions of the government that have
the effect of “taking” the property, in whole or in large part, outright or
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At the same time, the Restatement also made clear that:
A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police
power of states, if it is not discriminatory, . . . and is not
designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the
state or sell it at a distress price.159
Article 1110 of NAFTA has served as a blueprint for a number
of other agreements, spelling out the requirements as follows:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in
its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization
or expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with
[provisions pertaining to valuation and payment
procedures].160

in stages (“creeping expropriation”). A state is responsible as for an
expropriation of property under Subsection (1) when it subjects alien
property to taxation, regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or
that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective
enjoyment of an alien’s property or its removal from the state’s territory.
Id. § 712 Comment (g).
Id. § 712 Comment (g).
North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1110, Dec. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S.
No. 03,725. In its attempt to create a convention on expropriations, the OECD
suggested language similar to the NAFTA text:
159
160

A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize directly or

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

REGULATORY SPACE

41

The failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)161 used
similar language to NAFTA, but, importantly, used language that
attempted to clarify the difference between the right to regulate
and the need to compensate. A provision in the Annex spelled out
that: “[a] Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or enforce any
measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or
environmental concerns, provided such measures are consistent
with this agreement.”162
Moreover, the interpretative note to Article 5 concerning
expropriations and compensation spelled out that:
The reference in Article IV.2.1 to expropriation or
nationalisation and ‘measures tantamount to expropriation
or nationalisation’ reflects the fact that international law
requires compensation for an expropriatory taking without
regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the property
is not taken. It does not establish a new requirement that
Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or

indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another
Contracting Party or take any measure or measures having equivalent
effect (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except:
a) for a purpose which is in the public interest,
b) on a non-discriminatory basis,
c) in accordance with due process of law, and
d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation . . . .
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev., Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117, 126.
161 See generally Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO?
Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 713, 756-73 (2002).
162 Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Chairman’s Note
on the Environment and Related Matters and on Labour, Mar. 9, 1998, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9810e.pdf. The MAI was negotiated
between 1995 and 1998, but never attained the necessary support by countries to
come into existence. See generally Mary E. Footer, On the Laws for Attraction:
Examining the Relationship Between Foreign Investment and International Trade, in
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 105, 112–13 (Roberto
Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013).
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investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising
and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken
by governments.163
The change in treaty language is a good indicator that a
growing amount of weight is being given to non-economic values.
Accordingly, it has become increasingly apparent that international
investment law has turned away from seeing investment
promotion and protection as its sole purpose, at the expense of
other key values.
Over the course of the last fifteen to twenty years, a number of
additional criteria have been developed in the case law that shed
light on this distinction. 164 However, the case law has failed to
establish bright-line rules or, in the words of the tribunal in
Generation Ukraine, to establish a “checklist” or a “mechanical

163 Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment
Law 9 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No.
2004/4,
2004),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546
.pdf.
164 Other approaches exist, namely the “sole effects” doctrine applied in the
jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, NAFTA decisions, and a small
number of ICSID cases. In the case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, however, it is
important to bear in mind the particular circumstances of its creation and the
cases it dealt with, which were characterized mainly by claims related to the
seizing of physical property by the new government or individuals and groups
closely associated with the new government, or related to deprivation through the
appointment of new managers. Ralph F. Fuchs, Development and Diversification in
Administrative Rule Making, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 83 (1977). See, e.g., Tippetts, Abbett,
McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 219, 226 (1984); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000); Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa
Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶¶
71-72 (Feb. 17, 2000). See generally Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property By the
State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 331
(1982). But see Schreuer, supra note 147, at 119 (citing the Convention Establishing
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985, which defines
expropriation as “any legislative action or administrative action or omission
attributable to the host government which has the effect of depriving the holder of
a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his
investment”); and Dolzer, supra note 144, at 91 (stating that “[i]t is also beyond
doubt, however, that the more recent jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals reveals a
remarkable tendency to shift the focus of the analysis away from the context and
the purpose and focus more heavily on the effects on the owner.”).
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test.” 165 The criteria includes: (1) whether the measure is
discriminatory, (2) the extent to which governments interfere with
property rights, (3) the purpose of the measure, (4) whether the
measure is proportional regarding the impact on the investor and
the public policy that is being pursued, and (5) to what extent the
measure is contrary to legitimate investor expectations.166 Echoing
this development, Philippe Sands states that “those charged with
interpreting and applying treaties on the protection of foreign
investment need to take into account the values that are reflected
in norms that have arisen outside the context of the investment
treaty which they are applying.”167
3.2.1.1.1.

Non-Discrimination

A measure will not pass muster if it is de jure or de facto
discriminatory. As is true in other areas of international economic
law, discriminatory treatment in international investment law is a
cause for host state liability, unless justified in narrow
circumstances. The rationale is simple: without a level playing
field between domestic and foreign operators, foreign competitors
are likely to be at a disadvantage due to the lack of political
connectedness and inability to exert as much political pressure as
their domestic counterparts.
165 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Final
Award, ¶ 20.29 (Sept. 16, 2003). See generally Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 265 (Mar. 17, 2006).
166 See generally, Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to
Regulate: How to Draw the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 445, 462 (Katia YannacaSmall ed., 2010); Higgins, supra note 165, at 322-54; Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto,
Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 11–25 (2011) (discussing the standard used in finding
indirect expropriation, which focuses on the purpose of the regulatory measure);
Ratner, supra note 76, at 482-83 (providing a break down of several factors used to
assess government interference); Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 827 (listing
criteria numbers (1), (3) and (4), but acknowleding that they are not the end of
analysis, as the balancing of several relevant criteria is necessary); and Burns H.
Weston, “Constructive Takings” Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the
Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 103 (1975).
167
Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 198, 202 (2002).
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One of the paradigmatic cases in this regard is Ethyl Corp. v.
Canada.168 Concerned about the health and environmental effects
of a fuel additive called methylcyclopentadienyl manganese
tricarbonyl (“MMT”), the Canadian government attempted to ban
its importation, but did not provide evidence of a harmful health
effect from the use of MMT.169 Moreover, Canada prohibited only
the importation of MMT, not the production of MMT by its
domestic producers, thus hinting at some form of protectionist
agenda.170
A similar motivation appears to have been behind a later
decision by the Canadian government to ban the export of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste, which led to a complaint by a
U.S. company. The arbitral decision pointed out that the record
clearly indicated that the measure was put in place not on the basis
of health or environmental concerns, but rather as a protectionist
measure benefitting the domestic PCB waste industry. 171 The
tribunal found that the Canadian policy was primarily aimed at the
protection of the Canadian PCB disposal industry from foreign,
especially U.S., competition. 172 Such motivations, if sufficient
evidence can be found, can in most cases lead to a finding of a
measure’s illegality without the need for further evidence.
3.2.1.1.2.
Extent of Interference with Property
Rights
Often described as the most contentious, this element concerns
the extent to which a governmental measure must impact investor
rights to constitute an expropriation. 173 Not every miniscule
interference is reason for bringing an investment claim; rather, an

168
Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, NAFTAUNCITRAL, (June 24, 1998). See generally Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v.
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (Under NAFTA/UNCITRAL), 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 159
(2000).
169 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 166, at 29.
170 Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 834.
171 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award (NAFTA-UNCITRAL),
¶ 193 (Nov. 13, 2000).
172 Id. ¶ 194.
173 Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 837.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

REGULATORY SPACE

45

investor must absorb such interference as a regular commercial
risk.174 Yet, overbearing regulations may render property useless
without appropriate compensation. 175 It is therefore necessary to
find the proper balance between these two poles.176 Unlike direct
expropriations, where property is taken away by governmental
measures, this type of situation is characterized by significantly
reducing the commercial value of the property for the investors.177
At one extreme, which the Tecmed tribunal pointed out, are
situations in which the deprivation is total and extends over time.
In such situations regulatory measures could be an “indirect de
facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if the
assets or rights subject to such measure[s] have been affected in
such a way that . . . any form or exploitation thereof . . . has
disappeared.”178
Other situations are not as clear-cut. Oftentimes, profit is not
completely withheld, but is reduced, as was the case in Pope &
Talbot v. Canada. Since the company’s sales were not entirely
prevented, the tribunal found that the interference was not
“sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property
has been taken away from the owner.”179 A similar situation that
was truly regulatory in nature was at issue in S.D. Myers v. Canada,
concerning a ban on PCB waste export to the U.S. The tribunal
concluded that regulations constitute lesser interference than
expropriation.180 These tribunal decisions, together with others,181

174
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 335-36 (Sept. 11, 2007); and Starrett Housing Corp. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 156 (Aug. 14, 1987).
175 Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 25-26
(1995); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 30
(1986-1987); Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 835.
176 Ratner, supra note 76, at 498; Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 840.
177
But see Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 112 (Aug. 30, 2000) (deciding that the government’s
adoption of the Ecological Decree amounts to indirect expropriation); see also
Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 838.
178 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 116 (May 29, 2003).
179 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL-NAFTA, Damages, ¶
99 (May 31, 2002).
180 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA-UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶¶ 281-82 (Nov. 13, 2000).
181 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award,
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point to a shift away from the earlier examination of the impact on
the investor as the sole criterion for determining whether a
governmental measure is expropriatory or regulatory.182
3.2.1.1.3.

Purpose of Governmental Measure

Notwithstanding some contrary decisions,183 there appears to
have been a slow, albeit steady, recognition that the purpose of the
measure plays a role in the evaluation of a comprehensive
measure. 184 The tribunal in S.D. Myers referenced this type of
thinking when it found that a tribunal “must look at the real
interests involved and the purpose and the effect of the
governmental measure.” 185 These interests may be subject to
change over time through the coming into power of a new
government with different priorities, through new scientific
insights requiring new regulatory measures to combat risks that
were previously unknown (for instance, climate change), 186 or
through societal changes that favor protection of the environment

¶ 20.32 (Sept. 16, 2003); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v U.S., ICSID Case, Award, ¶ 536 (June
8, 2009); Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶
142 (Dec. 16, 2002); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 263 (May 12, 2005).
182 But see generally Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 111 (Aug. 30, 2000).
183 See supra note 164.
184 See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award, ¶ 356 (June 8, 2009)
(finding that, after evaluating the treatment of the claimant through a
comprehensive analysis, the international minimum standard of treatment was
not breached); G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under
International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307, (1962) (stating that “the existence of
generally recognized considerations of public health, safety, morals or welfare
will normally lead to a conclusion that there has been no ‘taking.’”). See also
SORNARAJAH, supra note 63, at 374 (explaining that “non-discriminatory measures
relating to anti-trust, consumer protection, securities, environmental protection,
land planning are non-compensable takings since they are regarded as essential to
the functioning of the state.”); Fortier & Drymer, supra note 156, at 326 (describing
the international law of indirect exproriation as “very sketchy and rough”).
185 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M.
1408, ¶ 285 (Nov. 12, 2000).
186
Markus Wagner, Taking Interdependence Seriously: The Need for a
Reassessment of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law, 20 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 713 (2012).
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over other considerations.
A number of investment tribunal decisions have recognized
that the purpose of a governmental measure is an element in
reaching the decision of whether compensation is mandatory or
not. The Feldman tribunal’s decision may contain the most specific
rationale to date, explaining that “governments must be free to act
in the broader public interest through protection of the
environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or
withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in
tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions, and the like.”187 This
decision was clearly informed by the idea that not every
governmental regulation, so long as it is reasonable, is
compensable. A measure’s purpose is often, though not always,
closely tied to the requirement that a measure be nondiscriminatory. There have been cases in which the purpose of the
measure may be laudable or genuinely based on the protection of
important societal values, yet such a measure fails because of a
protectionist purpose.188 In many ways, this is reminiscent of the
situation in the WTO.
3.2.1.1.4.

Proportionality

International investment law had for the longest time
functioned without making explicit reference to the principle of
proportionality.
This changed when the principle, guided
substantially by the European Court of Human Rights’
jurisprudence in James v. United Kingdom, 189 was introduced into
investment law by the decisions in S.D. Myers190 and Feldman191 and
187 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶
103 (Dec. 16, 2002).
188 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M.
1408, ¶¶ 252-57 (Nov. 13, 2000).
189 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1986). See also
Stephan Schill, Cross-Regime Harmonization Through Proportionality Analysis: The
Case of International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights, 27
ICSID REV. 87, 107 (2012).
190 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA, 40 I.L.M 1408, ¶¶ 252–57 (Nov. 13,
2000).
191 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (Dec.
16, 2002).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE)

48

3/16/2015 4:03 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:1

reiterated later in the Tecmed case.192 This principle or analytical
structure spells out that state action must not only serve a
legitimate goal, but must also be suitable (i.e., the purported goal
must be furthered by the measure), necessary (i.e., that no less
intrusive measure exists which achieves the same objective) and,
finally, proportional in a strict sense (i.e., the measure must
appropriately balance the competing interests of public policy and
private rights).193 It is important to recognize that the principle of
proportionality serves in the large majority of cases as a control
against governmental overreach or, at the very least, forces
governments to be more precise in their own assessments and
reasoning, lest they be subject to judicial review.194 It thus reflects
an approach that recognizes that rights are rarely absolute and
allows for a “more or less,” rather than an “all or nothing”
approach.195
The Tecmed decision has laid down a considerable amount of
this analytical structure.196 The case concerned a claim made by an
investor that the Mexican government failed to renew a temporary
operating license for a landfill for hazardous waste and, therefore,
breached its obligations contained in a BIT. The government’s
argument for refusing to renew the license consisted of lack of
reliability and operated against certain regulatory requirements.

192 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003).
193 See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing
and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75-6 (2008); Benedict
Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50
Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference
(Albert
Jan
van
den
Berg
ed.,
2009),
available
at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/146. See generally Robert Alexy, THEORIE DER
GRUNDRECHTE (1985); Aharon Barak, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).
194 Henckels, supra note 76, at 229; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 193; Erlend
M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 115-16 (2012). But see
generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International
Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 761 (2008).
195 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 21 (1977).
196 See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 121 (May 29, 2003) (recognizing that
even non-discriminatory regulations enacted for a legitimate public purpose may
entail compensatory responsibility).
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However, the refusal to grant the license only came about after
considerable protest by the local population, which prompted the
company to relocate to a different site. In the meantime, the
investor wanted to maintain the landfill for five months until the
new facility had been created.197 Today, it remains one of the only
decisions that attempts to distinguish an appropriate use of
governmental regulatory power from compensable expropriation.
It inquired into “whether such actions or measures are
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby
and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into
account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon
Moreover, the tribunal
deciding the proportionality.” 198
recognized that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the
foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any
expropriatory measure.”199
The S.D. Myers decision is important not only for recognizing
that there is a duty to enact measures that are least restrictive, but
also for referencing WTO law in this regard.200 Similar approaches
have been taken by other arbitral tribunals, although sometimes
without explicitly referencing the principle of proportionality or
without making its underlying assumptions explicit.201 In LG&E,
the tribunal stated that it was required to balance the “degree of
the measure’s interference with the right of ownership” against
“the power of the State to adopt its policies,” while being mindful
of the “context within which a measure was adopted and the host
197 Id. ¶ 99. The tribunal in the end decided that the decisive criterion for the
refusal to grant the license lay not in the alleged violations of permits, but rather
in political considerations. See Henckels, supra note 76, at 232-33.
198
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). See Henckels, supra note 76, at 232-33;
Stephan Schill, ‘Revisiting a Landmark’: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable
Treatment in the ICSID Case Tecmed, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 10-13 (2006).
199
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).
200 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, ¶¶ 215,
221, 255 (Nov. 13, 2000).
201 See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (2006).
See also Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability,
¶ 197 (Aug. 25, 2006) (finding the measure of pesification of the economy was “a
bona fide regulatory measure of general application, which was reasonable . . .
and proportionate to the aim of facing such an emergency”).
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State’s purpose.”202 Importantly, unlike the holding in Tecmed, it
found that social welfare considerations must stand behind
property rights “where the State’s action is obviously
disproportionate to the need being addressed.” 203 In El Paso v.
Argentina and Continental Casualty v. Argentina, the tribunal found
that as long as measures were generally applicable they would
only be compensable if they were “unreasonable, i.e. arbitrary,
discriminatory, disproportionate or otherwise unfair” 204 or
“intolerable, discriminatory or disproportionate.”205
3.2.1.1.5.
Legitimate
Expectations

Investment-Backed

A final criterion oftentimes mentioned is the extent to which an
investor relies on expectations at the beginning of the investment
and to what extent the investor could foresee changing
circumstances in the regulatory structure. It is clear that these
expectations must not be entirely left to the subjective assessment
of the investor, but must be objectified in some way. 206 The
assessment of whether a particular investor has suffered
deprivations that were unexpected is itself not wholly objective.
But, as the Chinn case before the PCIJ already made clear, investors
constantly face changing circumstances and not all expectations
must necessarily be fulfilled.207 Moreover, states may change the
regulatory structure over time and investors are not immune to
changing market conditions or changing regulatory environments.
What is important then is not that the regulatory landscape
changes, but that the circumstances change either dramatically or

202 LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶
189-94 (Oct. 3, 2006).
203 Id. ¶ 195.
204
El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, ¶ 241 (Apr. 27, 2006).
205 Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶
276 (Sept. 5, 2008).
206 YANNACA-SMALL, supra note 166, at 474.
207 Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12, 1934).
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abruptly, or both.208
An inquiry into the propriety of a regulatory change requires
an investigation of the circumstances and deliberations of the time
prior to the investment, for instance what type of promises were
made at that time and what expectations were raised with respect
to the time that a particular project would be permitted.209 This
was an issue in the Methanex case, which dealt with a California
ban on a fuel additive (MTBE).
The tribunal stated that
compensation required a showing of “specific commitments” that
“had been given by the regulating government to the then putative
foreign investor contemplating investment that the government
would refrain from such regulation.” 210 Moreover, in that
particular case, the tribunal found that investors must have been
aware of the potential for changing regulatory circumstances,
especially with regard to health or environmental issues.211
Taken together, these points were summarized by the Feldman
tribunal, which stated that “[g]overnments, in their exercise of
regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in

208

which

A different standard was contemplated in the Tecmed case, according to

[a] foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner,
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the
relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to
plan its investment and comply with such regulations.
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003). While this statement was made
obiter dictum, it has been cited approvingly by subsequent tribunals, e.g., MTD
Equity Sdn. Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case ARB/01/7,
Award, ¶ 114 (May 25, 2004); Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v.
Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case UN 3467, Final Award, ¶ 185 (Jul. 1, 2004);
Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, ¶ 235 (Aug. 19, 2005).
209
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 150 (May 29, 2003); and Azurix Corp. v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (2006), ¶ 316.
210 Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA-UNCITRAL, Ch. 11, Part IVCh. D, Final Award, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005).
211 Id. at 10. But see generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 124–27, 150
(May 29, 2003). The tribunal decided that in the process of deciding whether to
invest in the landfill, the investors substantially relied on a useful lifespan of ten
years for the operation.
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response to changing economic circumstances or changing
political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may
well make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to
continue.”212
A number of tribunals have taken a different approach than the
previously held “sole effect” doctrine, which focused almost
exclusively on the economic impact of a measure with respect to
the investor. The Saluka decision is instructive in this regard:
Faced with the question of when, how and at what point an
otherwise valid regulation becomes, in fact and effect, an
unlawful expropriation, international tribunals must consider
the circumstances in which the question arises. The context
within which an impugned measure is adopted and applied
is critical to the determination of its validity.213
Realizing that legitimate investment-backed expectations
deserve protection while simultaneously recognizing that
regulatory frameworks are subject to change over time (due to
scientific discoveries, developments in risk assessment or shifting
societal attitudes) is important, as it allows for greater coherence in
distinguishing two situations: those in which compensation is
required, from those in which an investor simply faces a different
regulatory environment and must bear the risk associated with an
investment.
Only a small number of tribunals have recognized this
distinction, because very few cases in which true regulatory
changes occurred have been decided. As the Pope and Talbot
tribunal explained, it is important to keep in mind in this context
that “a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a
gaping
loophole
in
international
protections
against
expropriations.” 214 The danger in allowing many measures to
escape compensation because the state could invoke the moniker
212 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶
112 (Dec. 16, 2002).
213 Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 264 (Mar.
17, 2006).
214 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA-UNCITRAL Ch. 11, Damages, ¶ 99
(May 31, 2002).
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“regulation,” when such compensation would otherwise be
justified, is clear. Yet relying on the economic impact of any
measure without taking into account the wider context in which a
particular measure takes place appears problematic. The proper
weight to lend to these factors cannot be determined in the
abstract, but rather it is the task of adjudicators to properly weigh
and balance the evidence presented to them. There may well be
times in which the economic effect on an investor is the most
important element of the overall equation, though in practice such
instances may be rare in true regulatory expropriation cases. The
changing nature of investment arbitration already underway will
determine whether this line of cases will continue into the future.
3.2.1.2.

Summary

The Feldman tribunal has carefully summarized the problem
that regulatory action poses:
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental
authorities may force a company out of business, or
significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business,
are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access
to infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of
unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others, have been
considered to be expropriatory actions. At the same time,
governments must be free to act in the broader public
interest through protection of the environment, new or
modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of
government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff
levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like.
Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be
achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek
compensation, and it is safe to say that customary
international law recognizes this.215

215 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶
112 (Dec. 16, 2002).
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When evaluating these circumstances, coming up with a
bright–line approach is a difficult, if not impossible, task. One of
the core questions is thus the proper balancing between the rights
of the investor and the ability of governments to regulate.
Carefully balancing the elements of discrimination, the extent of
interference with property rights, the purpose of governmental
action, proportionality, and the legitimate expectations of the
investor becomes key and does not allow for mechanical
evaluation.216
This leaves considerable discretion on the part of decision
makers in the interpretation of almost all of these factors,217 leading
some to resign themselves to referencing Potter Stewart 218 when
they say, “I know it when I see it.” 219 But the growing
jurisprudence appears to indicate that the sole criterion of
economic impact is no longer a view that is likely to prevail in the
future. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT encapsulates similar rules when it
posits, in the context of expropriation, that the economic impact of
government action is not the sole criterion for determining whether
an indirect expropriation exists. Other factors include “the extent
to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations” as well as “the character of the
government action.”220 Moreover, the 2012 Model BIT explicitly
states in Article 4(b) the right to regulate: “Except in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do
not constitute indirect expropriations.”221

216 In this sense, calls for maintaining the sole effect doctrine are misguided,
as only the totality of circumstances may provide a tribunal with all of the
necessary facts to make appropriate findings. This debate has crystallized in
WTO law in the context of the SPS Agreement. See generally Wagner, supra note
67, at 192 et seq.
217 For an overview of the literature, see Ratner, supra note 76, at 484.
218 See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
219 See generally Fortier & Drymer, supra note 156, at 327.
220 United States 2012 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex B, art. 4, ¶ a,
§§ ii-iii, 2012.
221 Id. at Annex B, art. 4, ¶ b.
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3.2.2. WTO Law: Trade Regulation in the SPS and TBT Areas
Under the WTO Agreement, the so-called standard of review
has undergone considerable debate since the inception of the
institution.222 Indeed, the debate in WTO law has concentrated on
this procedural vision of the extent to which WTO dispute
settlement organs can make inquiries into domestic regulatory
decisions. Rather than adding to the existing general literature,
this section focuses on how the WTO’s dispute settlement organs
and scholars have debated the question of how much regulatory
space WTO members should be accorded.
This has been
particularly at issue in cases concerning the SPS 223 and TBT
Agreements.224
The AB in the Hormones case remarked on the delicate balance
that must be struck between permitting WTO members the
necessary regulatory space and ascertaining that domestic
measures are not taken for protectionist purposes. 225 This
statement embodies the realization that while adjudication by
panels and the AB may evaluate to what extent a member is in
compliance with its obligations and thus fulfill its role of ensuring
the “security and predictability [of] the multilateral trading

222 Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 (1996); ROSS
BECROFT, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CRITIQUE AND
DEVELOPMENT (2012); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of
Review in WTO Law, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 491 (2004); Matthias Oesch, Standards of
Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635 (2003).
223 David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreeement of the World
Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
865, 875 (1999–00); SPS Agreement, supra note 141.
224 TBT Agreement, supra note 142. This section outlines the pertinent legal
questions surrounding the regulatory space according to WTO members within
disputes concerning the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.
225 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 115, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report] (stating that the SPS Agreement reflects
the “balance established . . . between the jurisdictional competences conceded by
the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the
Members for themselves.”); see generally Appellate Body Report, United States—
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 92–96,
WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body
Report].
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system,”226 the determination of what the applicable standard of
review consists of is also a political statement over the distribution
of power between different levels in a multi-level governance
system such as the WTO.
3.2.2.1.

SPS Agreement

The SPS Agreement allows members to take measures to
protect human, animal, and plant life or health from sanitary and
phytosanitary risks. It does so by employing a science-based
approach. For example, WTO members wishing to block the
importation of goods on the basis of a risk involving human,
animal, or plant life or health need to produce scientific evidence
justifying the measure. Article 2.2 SPS Agreement specifically
demands that measures be “based on scientific principles” and
“not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” 227
Combined with the rules contained in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 SPS
Agreement, which encourage members to follow international
standards in developing internal measures and which create a
rebuttable presumption of WTO consistency of an internal
measure, the SPS Agreement elevates international standards in
the subject matters covered by the SPS Agreement to a quasirequirement. Under Article 3.3 SPS Agreement, deviations from
such international standards in order to meet a higher level of
protection must be justified with scientific evidence. 228 This
involves procedural and substantive requirements, such as
carrying out a new risk assessment,229 which compels members to
“take into account available scientific evidence.” 230 Only in
circumstances in which “scientific evidence is insufficient” are
WTO members allowed to deviate from international standards,
provided that these members “seek to obtain the additional

DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2.
SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 2.2.
228
Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, ¶ 237, WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010).
229 SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 5.1.
230 Id. art. 5.2.
226
227
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information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk,”
which has to be carried out “within a reasonable period of time.”231
What follows is a more detailed analysis of the SPS Agreement
provisions as they relate to the degree to which WTO members
enjoy regulatory space in their decision-making process concerning
SPS matters.232
WTO members, while having the right to take WTO measures
under Article 2.1 SPS Agreement, must adhere to a number of
requirements in order to be in compliance with the SPS Agreement.
The basic obligation contained in Article 2.2 SPS Agreement lays
out that any measure is limited in scope “only to the extent
necessary” and must be based on “scientific principles and . . . not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” 233 This basic
obligation is buttressed by Article 5.1 SPS Agreement, which
mandates that a risk assessment be carried out when putting in
place measures that deviate from international standards.234 Under
the AB’s jurisprudence, the measure that a WTO member puts in
place must show “the existence of a sufficient or adequate
relationship” with the scientific evidence that the WTO member
has acquired.235 Sufficiency requires verifiable data to support the
conclusions and a “certain level of objectivity.”236 While this may
indicate that a higher evidentiary threshold is necessary for more
trade-restrictive measures, the AB has consistently pointed out that
WTO members also enjoy latitude – i.e. regulatory space – when it
remarked “responsible, representative governments commonly act
from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of
Id. art. 5.7.
See generally Wagner, supra note 67; TRACEY EPPS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT
(Alan O. Sykes & Mary E. Footer eds., 2008); JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
233 SPS Agreement, supra note 141, arts. 2.1–2.2.
234 Id. art. 5.1.
235 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶
80, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan – Agricultural Products II
Appellate Body Report].
236 Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Recourse
to Article 21.5 by Canada), ¶ 7.48, WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000). See generally also
Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, ¶ 84,
WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan – Apples Appellate Body
Report].
231
232
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irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are
concerned.”237
International standards play a large role in determining
whether a WTO member is in compliance with WTO law.238 In
order to achieve a higher level of harmonization, the SPS
Agreement is designed so that WTO members are in quasiautomatic compliance if their measures are “based on the relevant
international standards, guidelines or recommendations.” 239
Promulgated outside the ambit of the WTO itself, 240 the SPS
Agreement allows WTO members to put in place measures that
result in a higher level of protection than that provided by
international standards.
In such instances however, WTO
members have to provide scientific justification for deviating from
an international standard.
The contention in most situations concerning an SPS measure
is, therefore, if and to what extent a WTO member has scientific
evidence to back up the need for a higher level of protection than
that afforded by an international standard. A WTO member is
then obligated to carry out a risk assessment under Articles 5.1–5.3
SPS Agreement. In this context, the AB’s jurisprudence has

EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 124.
See Markus Wagner, International Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 238 (Tracey Epps & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., 2014) for an overview of the importance of international
standards in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. See JUNJI NAKAGAWA,
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (Jonathan Bloch &
Tara Cannon trans., 2011), for the development and application of standards in
international economic law.
239 SPS Agreement, supra note 141, arts. 3.1–3.2. See generally Terence P.
Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization
and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55, 57 (1999);
David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreeement of the World Trade
Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 875
(2000).
240
The Codex Alimentarius Commission develops standards, guidelines,
and recommendations for food safety relating to food additives, veterinary drug
and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and
codes and guidelines of hygienic practice. The International Office of Epizootics
develops relevant standards, guidelines, and recommendations for animal health
and zoonosis. The Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, in
cooperation with regional organizations operating within the framework of the
International Plant Protection Convention for plant health, develops international
standards, guidelines, and recommendations for plant health.
237
238
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recognized that the factors that WTO members may consider are
not limited to those that Article 5.2 SPS Agreement mentions, and
that a member’s measures do not take place in a laboratory, but
rather in “human societies as they actually exist, in other words,
the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
world where people live and work and die.”241 This leaves open
the question—thus far unanswered by the AB or the panels—
whether non-scientific factors (e.g. cultural preferences or
subjective positions such as different societal risk perceptions) can
be taken into consideration.242 While some authors claim that there
is only a “low empirical barrier” to be crossed, 243 the AB’s
jurisprudence in EC—Hormones indicates a considerable amount of
caution and maintains a central role for scientific evidence. The
EC—Hormones case makes clear that states have regulatory space
only after substantial empirical barriers have been overcome. It is,
however, also an indication that the AB – unlike the panels
deciding SPS cases 244 – has recognized that there is a complex
interplay of factors that goes beyond the laboratory setting.
The AB has taken a similarly permissive approach to a number
of other questions. Regarding what level of risk WTO members
have to accept, it recognized the accountability that domestic
decision-makers have when deciding whether to institute an SPS
measure.
It thus allowed WTO members to use minority
viewpoints in the scientific community and required only an
inquiry to “determine whether that risk assessment is supported
by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence[,] . . .”
provided that it meets “standards of the relevant scientific
241 EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 187. See generally
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, supra note 236, ¶ 207.
242 David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2005) (“[V]alue judgments
and public participation play an important role in generating reliable and
conclusive risk assessments, especially in new and contested risk situations.”);
Caroline E. Foster, Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade
Organisation’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L.
427, 427 (2008) (advocating a democratic approach to risk-taking).
243
M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an
Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 837 (2002).
244 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 8.91-8.160, 8.94-8.100 (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC –
Hormones Panel Report].
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community.”245 Similarly, the AB held that when implementing a
measure subsequent to carrying out a risk assessment, a measure
must have an “objective relationship” to the risk assessment and
must have been “sufficiently warrant[ed].”246 The panel had earlier
required a much stricter nexus, interpreting the meaning of the
term “based on” as having to conform much more strictly to the
results of the risk assessment.247
Finally, the SPS Agreement is cognizant of the fact that there is
a considerable amount of uncertainty in virtually all scientific
inquiry. Article 5.7 SPS Agreement was found to reflect the
precautionary principle and operates as a “qualified exemption” to
other provisions of the SPS Agreement. 248 Article 5.7 SPS
Agreement requires a showing of the following: (1) insufficient
scientific evidence; (2) a measure must be adopted “on the basis of
available pertinent information;” (3) a WTO member invoking this
provision must seek additional scientific information; and (4) the
measure is subject to review within a “reasonable period of
time.”249
The reflection of the precautionary principle indicates a certain
amount of regulatory space, provided that these preconditions are
met. Again, however, the AB made clear that the regulatory space
given to WTO members is not unlimited. The provision may only
be invoked in situations in which “the body of available scientific
evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the
performance of an adequate assessment of risks.”250 At the same
time, the AB rebuked attempts by the panel level251 to mandate a
“critical mass” standard “that would call into question the
fundamental precepts of previous knowledge and evidence so as to
make relevant, previously sufficient, evidence now insufficient.”252

245 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension, ¶¶ 590–91,
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter US – Continued Suspension
Appellate Body Report].
246 EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶¶ 189, 193.
247 EC – Hormones Panel Report, supra note 244, ¶ 8.137.
248 Japan – Agricultural Products II Appellate Body Report, supra note 235.
249 Id. ¶ 89.
250 Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, supra note 236, ¶ 179. See generally
also US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, ¶ 674.
251 Id. ¶¶ 703–05.
252
Panel Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
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In order to rely on a minority viewpoint, the AB found it sufficient
that a member provide a “qualified and respected scientific view
that puts into question the relationship between the relevant
scientific evidence and the conclusions in relation to risk, thereby
not permitting the performance of a sufficiently objective
assessment of risk on the basis of the existing scientific
evidence.”253 In these areas, the AB’s findings in general comport
with a more lenient approach than that accorded to WTO members
by the panels.254
3.2.2.2.

TBT Agreement

The situation with respect to the TBT Agreement has recently
been clarified to a certain extent through a number of WTO
decisions. 255 These disputes arose in quick succession after a
relative dearth of cases concerning the TBT Agreement. Although
none of these cases has dealt with the issue of regulatory space in
greater detail, a close reading of the cases reveals a general
approach towards how the issue of regulatory space is to be dealt
with under the TBT Agreement. The findings in these cases
involved a balancing between the dual goals of liberalizing trade
and preserving a member’s right to pursue legitimate policy

EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶ 7.648, WT/DS320/R (Mar. 31, 2008). See generally
Wagner, supra note 67, at 177–78.
253 US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, ¶ 677.
254 See generally Wagner, supra note 67, at 194 et seq.
255 Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/R (June 29, 2012)
[hereinafter US – COOL Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US – Tuna II Appellate
Body Report]; Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter
US – COOL Panel Report]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15,
2011) [hereinafter US – Tuna II Panel Report]; Panel Report, United States –
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2,
2011) [hereinafter US - Clove Cigarettes Panel Report]; US – Clove Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, supra note 225. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock
eds., 2014).
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objectives.256 The starting point for this analysis is Article 2.2 TBT
Agreement, which includes helpful elements to identify the
amount of regulatory space that WTO members have:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would
create.257
The provision entails elements that can be pursued in trying to
identify the regulatory space that WTO members have: including
that a technical regulation (1) pursue a legitimate objective, (2) is
not to be prepared, adopted or applied so as erect unnecessary
obstacles to trade, (3) is no more trade restrictive than necessary,
and (4) Members take account of the risk that non-fulfillment may
create.
Similar to Article 5.2 SPS Agreement, 258 Article 2.2 TBT
Agreement contains a list of legitimate objectives that may be
pursued, such as national security, the prevention of deceptive
practices, the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment.259 The wording indicates clearly
that these objectives are not exhaustive, and that WTO members
may invoke other objectives. 260 The AB and the panel have
reinforced this interpretation on numerous occasions.
For
example, in the Sardines case, the European Community made the
argument that a Codex Alimentarius standard was an ineffective
or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of legitimate objectives

256 See US - Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶¶ 92-96
(recognizing that “Members’ right[s] to regulate should not be constrained if the
measures taken are necessary to fulfil certain legitimate policy objectives,”
provided such measures do not constitute a “disguised restriction on international
trade”).
257 TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2.
258 SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 5.2.
259 TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2.
260 See id.
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because it failed to meet three objectives: consumer protection,
market transparency, and fair competition.261 In U.S. – Tuna II, the
AB interpreted Article 2.2 TBT Agreement as containing a nonexhaustive list of legitimate objectives, which were intended as
“examples” to “provide a reference point for which other
objectives may be considered to be legitimate in the sense of Article
2.2.” 262 The AB also noted that “objectives recognized in the
provisions of other covered agreements may provide guidance for,
or may inform, the analysis of what might be considered a
legitimate objective under Article 2.2.” 263 In Clove Cigarettes,
Indonesia unsuccessfully challenged the legitimacy of the United
States’ stated objective, i.e. the reduction of youth smoking.264
In the COOL case, the United States declared that the objective
of the provision was to provide consumer information about the
origins of certain meat products, thereby preventing confusion on
the side of the consumer.265 Procedurally, the AB reinforced the
point made by the panel, namely that it is incumbent on the
complaining party to prove that a measure did not pursue a
legitimate objective.266 Substantively, the AB left no doubt that it is
a legitimate objective for a WTO member to convey to consumers
product information for the purposes of preventing deceptive
practices and protecting consumers.267 The AB in COOL reiterated
its position from U.S. – Tuna II, pointing not only to the text of
Article 2.2 TBT Agreement itself,268 but also to other provisions,
such as the preamble of the TBT Agreement, and Articles XX(b),
XX(d), and IX GATT.269 The preamble recognizes that a member
shall not be prevented from taking measures necessary to achieve

261 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 7.113,
WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002). See generally Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Eighteenth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation of the TBT
Agreement, ¶ 2.2, G/TBT/33 (Feb. 27, 2013).
262 US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 313.
263 Id.
264 US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶¶ 7.345
265 US - COOL Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶ 7.581.
266 US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶¶ 442, 449.
267 US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 451.
268 Id. ¶ 451.
269 Id. ¶¶ 445, 462.
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its legitimate objectives “at the levels it considers appropriate.”270
Canada argued in COOL that, when a WTO member pursues an
objective not specifically listed in Article 2.2 TBT Agreement, such
an objective has to conform to the “significant elements of
commonality of the explicitly listed objectives” found in that
provision.271 The AB disagreed, noting that even though Canada
had not elaborated on alleged elements of commonality that would
“illuminate the relevant type of objective” and thus serve to
delineate the class of legitimate objectives that fall within Article
2.2 TBT Agreement, it would be “difficult to discern such
commonality amongst the disparate listed objectives that are,
moreover, ‘expressed at a high level of generality.’” 272 The AB
concluded that “any relevant ‘commonality’ would have to relate
to the nature and content of those objectives themselves,” and
rejected Canada’s position that such commonality can only be
found in limited situations where Article 2.2 TBT Agreement
objectives are explicitly listed in other covered agreements.273
The range of legitimate objectives is therefore rather wide, but
subject to the limitation stated in Article 2.2 TBT Agreement,
namely that any risk assessment must be carried out by taking into
account the “available scientific and technical information, related
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.”274
Article 2.2 TBT Agreement contains two elements that relate to
a necessity test, specifically the prohibition on “creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and the requirement
that technical regulations be “no more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.” This means that a
technical regulation that is more trade restrictive than necessary is
by default an “unnecessary obstacle to international trade.” 275
270 TBT Agreement, supra note 142, at pmbl. (noting that this wide latitude is
“subject to the requirement that [such measures] are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on
international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with [the TBT Agreement]”).
271 US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 435.
272 Id. ¶ 444.
273 Id.
274 TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2.
275 US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 318. See generally
Ludivine Tamiotti, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in MAX PLANCK
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, VOLUME 3: WTO - TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND
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According to the AB in U.S. – Tuna II, the following factors are
relevant in determining whether a technical regulation is “more
trade-restrictive than necessary”: (i) the degree of contribution
made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue, (ii) the
trade-restrictiveness of the measure, and (iii) the nature of the risks
at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from
non-fulfillment of the objective(s) pursued through the measure.276
At the heart of the analysis is a comparison between the challenged
measure and an alternative measure that is less trade restrictive,
but still capable of achieving the government’s legitimate objective.
The importance of properly identifying the objective pursued by
the measure becomes evident when taking into account that the AB
has developed a jurisprudence in which the weighing and
balancing that takes place is highly dependent on the competing
values in any situation. 277 In the Clove Cigarettes case, the U.S.
proffered human health and safety, and specifically the reduction
of youth smoking, as its objective.278 The panel found, referring to
the AB’s jurisprudence in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, that there was “a
genuine relationship of ends and means” between the objective
pursued and the measure at issue. 279 In U.S. – Tuna II, the
objectives of the measure at hand were the protection of animals
and the prevention of deceptive practices that could mislead
consumers.280 Importantly, the AB came to the conclusion that the
alternative measure proposed by Mexico – catching Tuna by
“setting on dolphins” – would not “achieve the United States’
objectives to an equivalent degree as the measure at issue.” 281
Rather, the alternative measure would contribute to a higher
mortality rate among dolphins and lead to other adverse health
effects in dolphin populations.282 In the final case, U.S. – COOL,
the AB made findings with respect to all three of the elements of
the analysis set forth in U.S. – Tuna II. Applying the three-factor
U.S. – Tuna II analysis, the AB found that: (i) while the COOL

SPS MEASURES mn. 16 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007).
276 US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 322.
277 US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 387.
278 US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶ 7.347.
279 Id. ¶ 7.417.
280 US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 303.
281 Id. ¶ 330.
282 Id.
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measures made some contribution to the objective pursued –
conveying to consumers information as to the origin of meat
products and thereby preventing deceptive practices – it was
unable to ascertain the degree to which the measure contributed to
the objective; 283 (ii) the measures were considerably traderestrictive because of the limiting effect of the measure on the
competitive opportunities for imported livestock compared to the
situation before the COOL measures took effect; 284 and (iii) the
consequences that may arise from the non-fulfillment of the
objective would not be particularly grave, as the unwillingness of
consumers to pay for the measure was not widespread.285
3.2.2.3.

Summary

The analysis undertaken by the AB in the TBT cases discussed
above is similar to the AB jurisprudence in the areas of the GATT
and the SPS Agreement. In the case of the GATT, there has been a
move away from a “least-restrictive means” test to one that is
“less-restrictive means” based, supplemented by a proportionality
test that weighs and balances a series of factors, including: the
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement
of the law or regulation at issue; the importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law or regulation; and the
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or
exports.286 The “weighing and balancing” was further explained
by the AB in EC – Asbestos, when the AB posited that, the more
important the common values pursued, the more easily the WTO
dispute settlement organs would accept the necessity of a
Member’s measure “designed to achieve those ends.”287 The effect
of this jurisprudence is that the AB provided WTO members with
regulatory space when taking internal measures. The AB’s

US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, at 476.
Id. ¶ 477.
285 Id. ¶ 478.
286 Korea – Various Measures on Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 138, ¶
164. See generally ANDREW D. MITCHELL, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO DISPUTES 177 et
seq. (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2008).
287 EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 134, ¶ 172.
283
284
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jurisprudence with respect to the SPS Agreement, as shown above,
has similarly provided WTO members such regulatory space when
taking SPS measures. However, this discretion is not unfettered.
The AB’s TBT Agreement jurisprudence shows a similar trajectory,
though with a somewhat more cautious stance.288 It does so on the
basis of its general approach with respect to the TBT Agreement
which has been to balance the “desire to avoid creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and “the recognition
of Members’ right to regulate.” 289 Given the AB’s tendency to
provide more regulatory space when vital or highly important
values are at stake, it is not surprising that this is especially true in
cases where human health or life is concerned, whereas the same
may not be true in instances when the values are considered to be
less important.
3.3. Regulatory Space for Domestic Decision-Makers: Converging
Trends in Trade and Investment Law?
The analysis of the ways in which international trade and
investment law deal with the question of how much regulatory
space is to be accorded to states or WTO members has shown a
trend towards convergence of the two fields, though important
differences remain.
One important difference, further elaborated below, is the
institutional setting of each field. While the WTO has an integrated
dispute settlement mechanism for arbitrating trade law issues,
international investment law is far more disparate in both its
substantive and procedural rules. Moreover, the existence of a
WTO appellate mechanism has led to the development of a
jurisprudence, which, while not always uniform, has attained a
much greater degree of coherence than is the case in international
investment law. 290 The existence of a dispute settlement

Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39, at 161.
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 96.
290 See Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO
PRACTICE (King’s Coll. London – The Dickinson Poon Sch. of Law, Research Paper
No. 2013-3) (providing a view that investment law as a field should shun
288
289
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mechanism and a relatively consistent line of cases elicit a clearer
jurisprudence with respect to the amount of regulatory space that
is being accorded to WTO members.
Properly understood, regulatory space is not an occasion for
states or WTO members to decide in an unfettered manner
whether to either treat investors in contravention of the existing
investment agreements or to prohibit a product from entering a
WTO member’s territory. Rather, it is the recognition that, under
particular circumstances a state or a WTO member has discretion –
within limits – to deny the (full) enjoyment of an investment or the
importation of a particular product, provided that a justification
can be provided. Like other dispute settlement organs, the AB has
attempted to delineate this regulatory space between two
competing goals: permitting WTO members to react to situations
in which particular values may be at risk, while trying at the same
time to curb potential abuse.
The recognition that the WTO’s approach before 1995 or
directly after 1995 did not take account of the complexities that
WTO members face has led to a shift of the jurisprudence of the
dispute settlement organs. This is the case with respect to the
GATT after the AB’s decision in Korea – Beef in which the AB
openly introduced not only a different conception of necessity
(from least-restrictive means testing to less-restrictive means
testing), but also proportionality testing through a process it
described as “weighing and balancing.” 291 The Korea – Beef
approach enables the AB to more adequately react to situations or
new developments as they arise and contextualize its response
depending on the different elements that factor into the “weighing
and balancing.” Such a development is not without risk, namely
because of the inherent power shift towards adjudicatory bodies.
These measures – recalibrating necessity within a larger move to
proportionality analysis – contribute to a wider regulatory space
for WTO members. Similarly, the jurisprudence of the AB has
consistency for its own sake) (forthcoming). See generally Arato, supra note 40, at
571-578. But see Federico Ortino, Legal Reasoning of International Investment
Tribunals: A Typology of Egregious Failures, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 31, 44 (2012)
(identifying the lack of internal consistency in investment decisions as a “failure in
the legal reasoning of investment tribunals”).
291 Korea – Various Measures on Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 138,
¶¶ 164, 166.
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shown – with different scope, as described above – that WTO
members enjoy a considerable amount of regulatory space under
both the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.
International investment law is currently witnessing a number
of discourses that may have profound implications for the field.
These discourses include the varying schools of thought that
conceive of international investment law as public law,292 as well as
other voices that argue over the legitimacy of international
investment law.293 Some of those discourses revolve around the
question of to what extent the field should undergo development
similar to that of international trade law. Decisions such as SD
Myers, Glamis, Tecmed and Continental are indications that the field
is moving towards greater acceptance of values that compete with
the protection of investors’ rights, and is becoming increasingly
deferential to states’ regulatory judgments. This is evident, for
example, when the panel in Glamis posited that it would invalidate
a state’s measure only if there was a “manifest lack of reasons for
the legislation,”294 or when the panel in Lemire v. Ukraine said that it
was the “inherent right” of a state “to regulate its affairs and adopt
laws in order to protect the common good of its people, as defined
by its Parliament and Government.”295
Yet at the same time, there is considerable disagreement over
the course that international investment law should take. Different
292 See, e.g., Schill, supra note 32 (discussing the hybrid nature of investment
arbitration, which combines substantive public international law and procedural
international commercial arbitration); Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 75
(discussing the shift in investor-state arbitration to a new public-law context and
the need for arbitral tribunals to develop standards for reviewing states’ public
regulatory activities); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 57.
293 Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 471 (2009); Susan
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005);
Julia Hueckel, Rebalancing Legitimacy and Sovereignty in International Investment
Agreements, 61 EMORY L.J. 601 (2012).
294 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. USA, ICSID, Award, ¶ 805 (June 8, 2009).
295 Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Liability, ¶ 505 (Jan. 14, 2010) (referring to the “high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters
within their own borders,” especially in cases when “the purpose of the legislation
affects deeply felt cultural or linguistic traits of the community” [emphasis in
original]) (quoting S.D. Myers Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M.
1408, ¶ 263 (NAFTA-UNCITRAL 2000)).
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tribunals have arrived at different conclusions when interpreting
the same language and the same general situation. For example,
after the peso crisis in Argentina, the ICSID tribunal in Enron took
a narrow view when applying the necessity test by using general
international law rules under the law of state responsibility, 296
whereas the tribunal in Continental Casualty explicitly referenced
international trade law. 297 Each tribunal arrived at a different
conclusion in its ruling. 298 Other investment tribunals have
similarly diverged over what standard is to be applied when
determining whether a state’s action is in violation of an IIA.299 It
is also worth mentioning how much the governmental measures
differ in both fields. Domestic trade measures generally result in
restrictions on the importation of a certain commodity into a
particular country, even though the exporting state is still able to
sell these goods to markets in other countries. In matters of
investment law, investors suffer a potentially greater risk, as
governmental measures could threaten their investments in their
entirety.
The current state of discourse in international investment law
over the degree to which states should be afforded regulatory
space can best be described as being in a state of flux.
Nevertheless, comparing the situation as recent as a decade ago
with today’s landscape yields a remarkable shift in the discourse.300
As some have pointed out, the current discourse is undertheorized.301 There is value – though it is not an end in itself – in

296
Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 322–45 (May 22, 2007).
297
Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶¶ 189–230 (Sept. 5, 2008). For a critical view of this decision, see José E.
Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense, Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y
319 (2010–11).
298
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
383, 384-93, 400-07 (2010).
299 Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest, 4
J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 203 nn. 34–37 (2013). See also Arato, supra note 40,
passim.
300 Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39, at 103–26.
301
Henckels, supra note 299, at 214; Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State
Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 6768
(2010),
available
at
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creating an adjudicatory system that provides something similar to
what the WTO’s DSU calls the “security and predictability [of] the
multilateral trading system.” 302 Participants in an adjudicatory
system would be better equipped to anticipate the decisions of a
tribunal if decisions were made in a more consistent fashion.
Moreover, by being open and clear about how they adjudicate the
degree of regulatory space states have, tribunals also contribute to
dissolving the legitimacy problem–real or perceived–that
international investment law is facing. Regardless of what position
one takes in the debate concerning the desirability of such a
convergence, 303 there is undeniably a profound shift in the
international investment law discourse towards the incorporation
of additional values when evaluating investment claims and thus a
closer approximation of the jurisprudence of other international
tribunals, notably that of the WTO.304
4. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES
This section will explain some of the reasons for the differences
between the fields of international trade and investment law. It
focuses on textual, contextual, and institutional explanations for
these differences, as well as the divergent epistemic communities
the fields engender. This is certainly not a complete list, but rather
an attempt to explain some of the salient differences that account
for why international trade and investment law have taken
different approaches to deciding the amount of regulatory space.
4.1. Text and Context
The most significant difference between the two fields is that,

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569412.
302 DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2.
303 Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 332; Arato, supra note 40, at 558;
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 75; Sweet & Mathews, supra note 193, at
154.
304
See Henckels, supra note 76, at 224 nn.1-2; Roland Kläger, Fair and
Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and
Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435, 446–48 (2010).
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while WTO law has positively codified justifications for
governments wishing to protect interests that are not
fundamentally economic, investment treaties have historically not
included similar provisions. As outlined above, justificatory
clauses have only recently become more common in IIAs.
Therefore, the starting point for the debate on providing regulatory
space in the two fields is different. Since the inception of the WTO,
jurisprudence has developed that takes the justificatory clauses in
treaty provisions seriously, the most well-known of which is
Article XX GATT. For example, the AB stated in U.S. – Shrimp that:
[t]he task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is,
hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking
out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to
invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the
other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g.,
Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby
distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that
Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as
expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the
line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases
differ.305
The AB has made similar findings regarding the relationship
between members’ rights306 and the justificatory provisions such as
those found in Article XX GATT, the SPS Agreement, and the TBT
Agreement.307
It may have been easier in the past to forego the recognition of
regulatory space in international investment law. Some of the
reasons include the absence of similar justificatory language in
international investment law agreements, combined with more
discrete cases of direct expropriation. Thus, José Alvarez and

305
306
307

US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 137, ¶ 159.
See, e.g. GATT, supra note 1, arts. I, III, XI.
See supra Section II, B, 2.
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Tegan Brink criticize the ICSID tribunal’s Continental decision for
its adoption of the AB’s Article XX GATT jurisprudence without
sufficiently explaining the rationale for doing so. 308 Their
argument that the two-tiered analysis under Article XX GATT –
first determining which of the justifications in (a) through (j)
applies, and then deciding whether a measure runs afoul of the
chapeau – influences the way in which the term “necessary” is
interpreted, is valid.309 This is the reason why this article does not
focus on interpreting the term “necessary” on its own, but rather
uses the concept of regulatory space. Cases involving the
distribution of essential services such as water and cases involving
health or environment or other public concerns have been brought
before international investment tribunals.310 In these instances –
and especially in cases where such policy decisions follow a
genuine democratic process – it will be increasingly difficult to
avoid according states at least some regulatory space, even in the
absence of the specific justificatory language that is usually
contained in more modern BITs.311
The change that model BITs are undergoing concerning treaty
language, and the growing variety in the types of challenges that
are being brought before international investment tribunals,
coincides with an increase in the number of countries from which
investments are made. The addition of justificatory clauses in
model BITs takes place at roughly the same time when investment
streams are changing from being predominated by unidirectional
investments from developed to developing countries to investment
streams that are increasingly multi-directional. Countries that
were previously almost exclusively capital-exporting now find
themselves being brought before tribunals as respondents in a
system that they had previously had a great interest in
maintaining.
An additional element that is worth pointing out consists of the

308 Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 345. For a similar criticism concerning
the neglect of contextual arguments with respect to “likeness,” see Kurtz, supra
note 39, at 755 et seq. and 759 et seq.
309 Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 345-48. But see generally Mitchell &
Henckels, supra note 39, at 158-59.
310 Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 14–15.
311 Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 329; Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39,
at 93.
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functional differences between international trade and investment
law. The former has traditionally been portrayed as pitting states
against a less powerful investor, whereas the latter involves
disputes between two WTO members.312 Moreover, the purpose of
WTO law can correctly be summarized as having “twin objectives
of trade liberalization (positive) and the prevention of
protectionism (negative).” 313 Traditionally, one of the goals of
investment law has been the protection of investors against
powerful states – a goal that is not likely to vanish any time soon.
The following statement demonstrates this view: “At [the heart of
international investment law] lies the right of a private actor to
engage in an arbitral litigation against a (foreign) government over
governmental conduct affecting the investor.”314
But it could be argued that, in certain cases, limiting the goal of
international investment law solely to the protection of investors is
a very narrow view of the raison d’être of this field of law. Rather –
in parallel to how WTO law has been described – international
investment law cases involving public policy matters not only have
the positive objectives of providing protection for investors and the
promotion of foreign direct investment, but also the negative goal
of preventing that very protection from allowing responsible
governments to make public policy choices.
This ties in significantly with the different remedies available in
both systems. WTO law is designed to bring an offending member
“back into compliance” – in other words, its remedies are entirely
prospective and any countermeasures can be executed against such
a member only after the Dispute Settlement Body made a finding
of non-implementation. This is a function of the diplomatic origin
of the GATT / WTO regime and of the desire to incentivize
members to reposition themselves so that the trade system can
function at the most efficient state that WTO members agreed
upon. By contrast, international investment law’s remedies are –
by and large – retrospective and are designed to monetarily
reprimand a state for the wrongs it has inflicted upon an investor.
There can be no doubt that these differences are important and that

Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 349.
Id. at 347.
314
Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTAUNCITRAL, Separate Opinion by Thomas Wälde, ¶ 13 (Jan. 26, 2006).
312
313
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they play a crucial role in evaluating the different regimes.315 At
the same time, it is at least worth inquiring whether certain
regulatory expropriation cases – such as when an investor
challenges the regulatory fabric of the host state by challenging
general and abstract provisions concerning, for example, health or
environmental measures – should be analyzed differently from
traditional expropriation cases. It is at least questionable whether,
in a case concerning the health impact of harmful substances, the
traditional investment law remedy is truly retrospective. Given
that the findings of investment tribunals may deter other states
from adopting the same measures, investment law can be
prospective under certain conditions.316
4.2. Institutional Reasons
Another explanation for the differences between investment
law and trade law with respect to the amount of regulatory space
lies in the different institutional designs within each field. As
discussed above, the adjudicatory systems in the two fields are
remarkably different. Two specific and interrelated features of
investment law, which distinguish it from trade law, are worth
pointing out – the lack of the existence of an appellate mechanism,
and the lack of a system of precedent.
The most salient difference, which critics of the move towards
more regulatory space in international investment law are quick to
point out, is the ad hoc nature of international investment law
adjudication. 317 Unlike WTO law, which has an appellate
mechanism, international investment law is a radically
decentralized system with “no authoritative voice” to resolve
differences. 318 This is unsurprising, given the very nature of
international investment law with its thousands of individual
bilateral and multilateral instruments with differing venues,
315 Alan Sykes, Public v. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of
Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 631 (2005).
316
Indeed, Philip Morris’ Notice of Arbitration, supra note 15, ¶ 49,
demands “discontinuance of the plain packaging legislation.”
317 Arato, supra note 40, passim; Roberts, supra note 39, at 48.
318 Roberts, supra note 39, at 48-52.
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compared to the very existence of the WTO as a unifying
institution.319 Indeed, this difference leads to divergences in a great
number of cases. There have been debates over the years
concerning the introduction of a “WTO-style” appellate procedure
in investment law. Even though the decisions rendered by the
WTO AB are not binding on the panels or even on the AB itself, its
findings are nonetheless regularly followed and regarded as
having precedential value.320
The lack of an appellate mechanism – suggested in various
forms321 – in the realm of international investment law has been
continuously debated over the last decade.322 Most of the criticism
has been directed at the potential of prolonging disputes and
endangering the finality of an arbitration award, both of which are
valued in the current system as important characteristics.323 Given
the highly fragmented nature of international investment law, it is
unclear how such an appellate system could actually be
implemented in practice. Parties would have to agree to submit to
an additional layer of scrutiny, and treaties would presumably
have to be amended.324 It is beyond the scope of this paper to
319 Franck, supra note 293, at 1619-22; Donald McRae, The WTO Appellate
Body: A Model for an ICSID Appeals Facility?, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 371, 382-86
(2010).
320 In particular fields, some panels have been reticent to do so. For an
analysis of the different SPS Agreement jurisprudence between various panels
and the AB, see Wagner, supra note 67, at 194.
321 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 57, at 180-84; Franck, supra note 293, at 161725; David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in
Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 54-73
(2006); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, IIA Issues Note,
No.
2,
(2013),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf
(discussing concerns with the current investment law dispute resolution system,
including deficit of legitimacy and transparency, and inconsistencies in awards).
322
See the contributions in KARL P. SAUVANT, APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2008); and McRae, supra note 319; Gantz,
supra note 321.
323
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 103-06 (1992).
324
See generally Nicolas Hachez & Jan Wouters, International Investment
Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century: Does the Preservation of the Public Interest
Require an Alternative to the Arbitral Model? 22-3 (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven –
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 81, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009327; and ICSID Secretariat, Possible
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further analyze the reasons why these proposals are unlikely to
succeed. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out the advantages of
such a system. The contribution of the AB as an institutional factor
towards building a coherent jurisprudence in WTO law can hardly
be overstated. While other changes in the procedure put in place
during the Uruguay Round were important, such as the adoption
of panel or AB decisions by the Dispute Settlement Body through
the process of reverse consensus, the addition of a permanent
appellate mechanism could be described as a crucial element in the
success of the WTO’s adjudicatory mechanism.325 A permanently
staffed appellate mechanism could deflect criticism with respect to
the independence and impartiality of the tribunals that is leveled
against the current system of investment arbitration. 326 As
mentioned before, coherence is not a virtue in and of itself,327 but it
has served other areas in international law rather well. There is
also no doubt that the introduction of an appellate mechanism
comes at a cost,328 but one that other systems have found worth
paying.
Given that the likelihood of an institutional reform is at this
time rather small, another mechanism that may bring about greater
coherence is the use of previous decisions as a form of quasiprecedent. 329 The arbitral panel in Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh,
similar to a large number of other decisions,330 recognized on the
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 4-5 (Discussion Paper, Oct. 22,
2004),
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublications
RH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceN
o=14_1.pdf.
325
An additional element for the generally positive view of the WTO
jurisprudence’s legitimacy was the careful jurisprudence of the first wave of
members of the AB.
326 Gantz, supra note 321, at 68; Hachez & Wouters, supra note 324, at 23.
327 See Schultz, supra note 290, at 2.
328 Santiago Montt, What International Investment Law and Latin America Can
and Should Demand from Each Other: Updating the Bello/Calvo Doctrine in the BIT
Generation, 3 RES PUBLICA ARGENTINA 75, 94 (2007).
329 Other mechanisms exist in that regard, such as the annulment committees
under Article 2(1) of the ICSID Convention, and the domestic court’s refusal to
enforce particular awards even though their systemic efficacy is doubtful. For an
in-depth analysis of previous decisions used as a form of quasi-precedent, see TaiHeng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1014, 1021 (2006).
330
A similar statement can be found in ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC &
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one hand that it was not bound by previous decisions. However, it
did point out that
[a]t the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due
consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals.
It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of
consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics
of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case,
it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious
development of investment law and thereby to meet the
legitimate expectations of the community of States and
investors towards certainty of the rule of law.331
Jan Paulsson similarly found that there is a growing body of
coherent jurisprudence in investment disputes when he stated,
“[t]hat a special jurisprudence is developing from the leading
awards in the domain of investment arbitration can only be denied
by those determined to close their eyes.” 332 This has been
confirmed by empirical studies showing that certain awards enjoy
greater respect than others and consequently are cited more
frequently.333 The proposition that there is no de jure precedent in
ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 293 (Oct.
2, 2006) (stating, after pointing out the non-binding nature of previous decisions,
that “cautious reliance on certain principles developed in a number of those cases,
as persuasive authority, may advance the body of law, which in turn may serve
predictability in the interest of both investors and host States.”).
331 Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Case No. ARB/05/07,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 67
(Mar. 21, 2007).
332 Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms:
Treaty Arbitration and International Law, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 13, 12 (2007).
See generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or
Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357 (2007); J. Romesh Weeramantry, The Future Role of Past
Awards in Investment Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV. 111, 113 (2010) (“[A]ntecedent
awards in the reasoning of [why] investment tribunals are so frequent that the
practice has almost become an integral part of the investment arbitration award
reasoning process”).
333
Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A
Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 148-53 (2007)
(reviewing the role that precedent has played in 207 publicly available decisions,
awards, and orders rendered since 1972—including decisions rendered by early
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international investment law has, however, been countered with
the view that there is a de facto precedent regime.334
Arbitrators disagree over the issue of precedent, as evidenced
by the decision in Burlington Resources v. Ecuador. In that case, the
divided panel noted, “it has a duty to seek to contribute to the
harmonious development of investment law, and thereby to meet
the legitimate expectations of the community of States and
investors towards the certainty of the rule of law.”335 However,
one of the panelists found that an arbitrator has a duty to “decide
each case on its own merits, independently of any apparent
jurisprudential trend.”336
Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler, an arbitrator in the Saipem decision,
summed up the tendency of international investment law – with a
different trajectory compared to commercial arbitration, a field in
which precedent is virtually non-existent 337 – as follows: “in
investment arbitration, there is a progressive emergence of rules
through lines of consistent cases on certain issues, though there are
still contradictory outcomes on others.”338
The point here is not to take a position in the debate about the
value of an (unlikely to be implemented) appellate mechanism, or
the reasons for or against the use of precedent in the highly
decentralized system of international investment law.339 However,

ICSID tribunals, ICSID, ICSID (AF), and certain non-ICSID investment treaty
tribunals); Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 (2008) (analyzing ICSID decisions from
the past ten years, and indicating that “there is a tendency among ICSID tribunals
to contribute to a homogeneous development of the methodology of international
law”).
334 Cheng, supra note 329, at 100; Lucy Reed, The De Facto Precedent Regime in
Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case Management, 25 ICSID REV. 95
(2010); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 265, 270 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) (observing that “an accretion of
decisions will likely develop a jurisprudence constante—a ‘persisting jurisprudence’
that secures ‘unification and stability of judicial activity.’”).
335
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 187 (Dec. 14, 2012).
336 Id. ¶ 187.
337 Weeramantry, supra note 332, at 112.
338 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 332, at 373.
339 It is worth pointing out, however, that precedent functions as a limitation
to those who would otherwise be less encumbered to decide according to their
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both mechanisms have, at least in the case of the WTO, contributed
to the development not only of a consistent jurisprudence, but also
the development of overarching principles. More importantly, this
finding has held true across a number of treaties. The wideranging use of the proportionality principle would not have been
developed in the absence of a permanent appellate mechanism that
is not dependent on reappointment in any particular dispute. The
jurisprudence in the SPS Agreement area may be particularly
instructive. The AB has created a coherent jurisprudence involving
the amount of regulatory space a WTO member has with respect to
a number of SPS Agreement provisions. It did so against a number
of panel decisions that fought a rearguard action holding a rather
narrow view of what options WTO members have to justify their
domestic measures.340
There is little doubt that international investment law has
matured into a system that has developed or is in the process of
developing overarching principles.
Instituting an appellate
mechanism and using precedent are helpful elements in providing
a basis for a coherent jurisprudence. Over a period of time, they
are capable of elucidating such principles with greater force than is
possible under a fragmented system currently present in
international investment arbitration. Conversely, the lack of an
appellate mechanism or use of precedent are factors that explain
why international investment law is only beginning to follow the
footsteps of international trade law.
4.3. Different Epistemic Communities
Another important difference concerns the actors that
participate in international adjudication. One’s experience and
background presumptively have an impact on not only what
decisions are being made concerning a particular question, but also
how decisions are made. Such decision-making involves a number
of complex considerations, including personal and professional

own sense of what consists of a just outcome. Precedent would require arbitrators
to justify their desires to deviate from previous findings.
340 Wagner, supra note 67, at 197.
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interests.341 These considerations may not only consist of interests
advancing the field with one’s own vision in mind of what it
should look like, or what is best for society in the aggregate, but
may also consist of the desire to maintain one’s relative position in
a particular area (e.g. reappointment for a coveted position).
In this sense the background of an actor, or what epistemic
community she belongs to, is of great importance.342 Both WTO
law and international investment law have originated as areas of
“exotic and highly specialized [knowledge].” 343 To varying
degrees, the two fields have moved away or are moving away
from their respective traditional paradigms. While trade law used
to be almost entirely dominated by lawyers operating in offices
equivalent to the United States Trade Representative in the U.S., or
offices equivalent to the Directorate General in the EU, the tradefocused concerns exhibited by these actors have been replaced with
a considerably wider angle incorporating, for example, health or
environmental concerns. 344 There is a debate currently in
international investment law over the question to what extent an
arbitrator’s background has an impact on the decisions she
renders.345
341 See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 76, at 517 (noting that there is an “arbitral
culture,” and when arbitators deviate from the traditional arbitrator methodology,
for unfair procedures and unconvincing opinions, “they have failed” at their
arbitration duties). See generally McRae, supra note 6, at 3-6.
342
See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (defining epistemic communities as
consisting of “networks of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue area.”). The use of the concept of
epistemic community does not preclude the possibility that different epistemic
communities can at least partially converge, nor that individuals can belong to
more than one epistemic community. In the context of international investment
law, see Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 11; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global
Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 465-466 (2010); Julie A. Maupin,
Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds.,
2013), Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT.’L L. 387
(2014).
343 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group
of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 8 (Apr. 13, 2006).
344 See also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 30, at 519 (noting that “the WTO
has increasingly ‘opened’ to a common culture of international lawyers.”).
345 See generally Roberts, supra note 39, at 85; José Augusto Fontoura Costa,
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A considerable number of participants in the field of
international investment arbitration originate from the area of
commercial arbitration. That field is characterized by an equality
of arms between the two sides in arbitration. Under such a
paradigm, the question of whether states enjoy a certain amount of
regulatory space inherently contests fundamental assumptions
about how arbitration works.346 The challenge that international
investment law has faced over the last years derives from a wholly
different framework: public international law. As public law, the
field is infused with deference to domestic decisions, paving the
way for providing regulatory space for states. Another element
that separates the two fields is the idea that commercial arbitrators
decide individual and discrete cases with little or no policy
implications.
Thus, the dissenting arbitrator in Fraport v.
Philippines remarked that “the integrity of this interpretative
process must not be compromised by the pronouncements of other
arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of different treaties in
wholly unrelated factual and legal contexts.”347
Those adjudicators coming from a public international law
perspective proceed on different assumptions, namely that their
decisions are contributing towards a global world order. The
impact of such a starting point is visible with increasing frequency,
as more and more individuals cross the “boundary” between these
epistemic communities. The much-criticized348 Continental decision
may serve as an example where one of the arbitrators may have
had decisive influence in the inclusion of Article XX GATT

Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The Creation of International Legal
Fields,
1
OÑATI
SOCIO-LEGAL
SERIES
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832382.
346 Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under
the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State - Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure,
Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 4-5 (2010); Stephan W. Schill,
Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review
Through Comparative Public Law, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 9 et seq. (2012)
(asserting that “public international law approaches have greater value for
understanding why states deserve deference” and pointing out that deference is
rooted in the public law concept of separation of power).
347
Fraport A.G. Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Bernardo
Cremades, ¶ 7 (Aug. 16, 2007).
348 See e.g., Footer, supra note 162, at 134; Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297.
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jurisprudence in the panel’s decision.349
Stephan Schill has aptly summarized the difference between
private commercial and public international lawyers, stating:
[They] often have different perspectives on and different
philosophies about the role of law, the State, and the
function of dispute resolution. Also, their audiences and
conceptual approaches are often different. Whereas public
international lawyers embed international investment law
firmly in general international law and approach the topic
against that background, commercial arbitral lawyers focus
on dispute settlement and see investment treaty arbitration
as a subset of international (commercial) arbitration.350
The traditional paradigm of international investment law posits
that decisions in one case should not have larger policy
implications. However, that paradigm is – in a certain category of
cases involving the regulatory fabric of a country – no longer valid.
This is true for cases that rather clearly implicate public policy
choices. The foremost current example is the challenge against
Australia’s measure concerning the plain packaging of cigarettes
and the decision by Germany to place restrictions on the use of
coal-fired power plants.351 In such cases it is hard to argue that
states – especially when a measure has been passed with
considerable democratic safeguards – should not be accorded

349
For other examples, see Roberts, supra note 39, at 86. See also
Commission, supra note 333, at 136 (noting, “[a]s to investment treaty decisions
and awards emanating from ICSID tribunals, however, the tribunal members are
no longer ever-changing. Put simply, their backgrounds, qualiﬁcations,
experiences in international law and their regular interactions, both professionally
and otherwise, have contributed to the development of an esprit de corps
amongst ICSID and other investment treaty arbitrators.”). For a fundamental
critique of the investment law system, including the aspect of the relatively small
pool of investment arbitrators, see Public Statement on the International Investment
Regime, 31 August 2010,
OSGOODE HALL L. SCH.,
available at
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement and Tom Toulson, Investment
Treaty Arbitration is ‘Unfair’, Say Academics, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 10, 2010).
350 Schill, supra note 32, at 888.
351 For a number of other cases involving governmental regulatory powers
see Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 14-15.
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regulatory space.352
Marrying public law maxims with a dispute settlement
community that has, to a significant degree, evolved from
commercial arbitration creates friction and brings about challenges
and disputes over the supremacy of interpretative primacy.353 One
of these frictions lies in the adjustment of expertise that
adjudicators will have to bring with them. This requirement of
adjustment is true for all participants. Some convincingly argue
that some commercial arbitrators have an insufficient grounding in
public international law and appreciation that they are no longer
refereeing a match that concerns only the disputing parties, while
some public international lawyers have an inadequate grasp on
economics, commercial law, and how to conduct proceedings.354 It
should also be recognized that international investment law is not
alone in facing such a change or clash of legal culture(s), but that
other fields – including international trade law – have undergone
similar challenges.355
The need for regulatory space may not have been apparent in a
certain category of international investment disputes at a time
when the disputes oftentimes concerned discrete governmental
measures against an investor. Such disputes more closely resemble
the paradigm of commercial arbitration – a field that has spawned
a large number of international investment arbitrators who shaped,
to a large extent, the ethos that dominated the field of investment
arbitration for a considerable period of time. The changing nature
of investor-state proceedings, and the influx of participants and
commentators with different paradigms, has led to a changing
discourse over the extent public policy considerations should play
in investment arbitration. Similar developments have taken place

352 But see Wälde, supra note 346 (addressing some procedural challenges
arising in investment disputes, and suggesting that arbitral tribunals have a duty
of restoring equality of arms affected by government powers).
353 Weiler, supra note 140, at 194-97.
354 Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 262–63, (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds.,
2008). See generally Schill, supra note 32, at 889; William W. Burke-White &
Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review
in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 331 (2010).
355 Joseph Weiler addresses the difference between the culture under the
GATT and the WTO in Weiler, supra note 140, at 194–97.
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in WTO law, which saw a stronger recognition of public policy
questions, not only between the periods of the GATT and the WTO
(due to different procedures in the dispute settlement process), but
also since the inception of the WTO in 1995.

5. CONCLUSION
This article shows that international trade and investment law,
despite their differences, are two closely related fields; and, in
many ways, constitute two sides of the same coin. Both areas have
undergone, or are currently undergoing, considerable changes
with respect to the degree to which they permit states and WTO
members regulatory space in determining domestic public policy.
To show the development of the slow convergence, and how the
two systems deal with allowing states to make policy decisions in
such fields as the environment or human health, this analysis
focused on (1) regulatory expropriations in the case of international
investment law, and (2) the SPS Agreement and the TBT
Agreement in the case of WTO law.
The debate over regulatory space is particularly vigorous in
international investment law, where the traditional paradigm of
the protection of investors has had to contend with views that
favor balancing public policy matters against the need for investors
to be protected against governmental intrusion.356 Over the last
years, this development has manifested itself in different schools of
thought ranging from debates about the legitimacy of the entire
international investment law enterprise to arguments over the
public law nature of the field.
WTO adjudicators have incorporated competing interests into
their decisions. Indeed, an overarching jurisprudence across
different treaties has developed under the WTO umbrella. Some
arbitrators have made explicit reference to the jurisprudence of not

356
The stakes in international investment arbitration are rising. Several
awards have ranged in more than 100 million dollars, while a number of pending
cases involve damage claims above one billion dollars. Joshua B. Simmons,
Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 196, 196 (2012).
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only the WTO, but also other international tribunals such as the
European Court of Human Rights. This, of course, does not mean
there should be a wholesale convergence between international
investment law and WTO law. As Mary Footer rightly points out,
“[t]here are . . . limits on the extent to which WTO jurisprudence
can be brought into investment arbitration,” and referencing other
fields of international law should certainly be more than “an
opportunistic cross-referencing exercise.”357
This article has taken a different approach in comparing the
amount of regulatory space, and found that there are indeed
converging trends in not only the academic discourse between
investment law and WTO law, but also the jurisprudence in both
The current development and discourse over
fields. 358
international investment law is reminiscent of the debates in
international trade law shortly after the creation of the WTO in
1995. This article has laid out some of the factors that explain the
differences between the two fields. Some of the factors are textual,
contextual, and historical.
These reasons certainly do not
constitute an exhaustive list. International investment law and
WTO law have developed from different bases and have had
different goals. Another factor that has led to a lack of coherent
jurisprudence, with respect to taking account of domestic policy
decisions in international investment law, has an institutional
basis. It is unlikely that the current ad hoc system will be replaced
with an AB-style forum where tenured judges carry out the
decision-making.359 There may be reasons militating against this
Footer, supra note 162, at 138.
Whether, as Debra Steger suggests, trade and investment law should be
fully integrated or whether the two fields should remain separate is not the point
of this article. Steger, supra note 45, at 156. Others find a dangerous tendency “to
hyperbolize the influence [of trade law] on [investment law]” or “to
mechanistically design public policy solutions in international investment law by
mere transplant of the public policy interpretations, methodological approaches,
and institutional solutions that have uniquely evolved within international trade
law . . . [,]” calling those who argue for stronger convergence of rationales—
though not necessarily for wholesale adoption—a “tribe of enthusiasts.” Desierto,
supra note 39, at 6-10.
359 VAN HARTEN, supra note 57, at 180–84. Cf. Ratner, supra note 76, at 516-20.
For a view against creating a standing body, see Paulsson supra note 42; SANTIAGO
MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 155–59 (2009);
Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Disputes,
357
358
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approach, but such a position may have to be reviewed now that
more investment tribunals are moving towards making decisions
not only with respect to individual cases, but also with respect to
more generally applicable regulatory policies. The final reasons
why international investment law has been less welcoming in
recognizing domestic policy decisions are the differences between
the epistemic communities investment and trade law. While
international trade law has been somewhat divorced from other
fields of international law for some time, the distinction for
international investment law has been more formidable. This, as
well as the long-standing tradition of the participants in
international investment law who have a background in
international commercial arbitration, is another factor that should
not be underestimated. Recognizing the reasons why important
differences between the two fields remain may help shape the
discourse over the convergence between international trade and
investment law.
This article does not promote the view that substantive
obligations in international investment law should be rewritten.
Instead, it argues that some of the jurisprudence developed in
international trade law as well as the discourse concomitant with
these changes can serve as a form of blueprint for a future system
of international investment law that takes these concerns seriously.
The current system, having focused on individual rights, can
evolve into one that takes contrasting societal goals seriously,
while anchoring its collective interpretative exercise in the texts of
existing investment agreements.
***

in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 231 et seq. (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2008). See generally on the issue of harmonization of international
jurisprudence YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 113 et seq. (2003); Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law
Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998).
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